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RELIGION AND REHABILITATION: THE
REQUISITION OF GOD BY THE STATE
DEREK P. APANOVITCH
INTRODUCTION
Eddie Jones was sentenced to prison, having pled guilty to driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol (DUI).1  The judge suspended the
sentence, on the condition that Jones successfully complete a pro-
gram for substance abuse treatment and education while residing at
an Iowa correctional facility.2  As part of the program, Jones, an
atheist, was required to recite from the Alcoholics Anonymous Big
Book—the so-called Bible for Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)3—the
following: “We will intuitively know how to handle situations which
used to baffle us.  We will suddenly realize that God is doing for us
what we could not do for ourselves.”4  Jones refused to say the pas-
sage and, as a result, his prison sentence was reimposed.5
Jones is not the only DUI offender to have faced the difficult
choice between incarceration and participation in a religiously-
oriented alcohol rehabilitation program.  In response to high levels of
drunk driving in the United States,6 most state legislatures have en-
acted laws that require alcohol education and treatment programs for
1. See Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29,
1993).
2. See id.
3. See Richard W. Thoreson & Frank C. Budd, Self-Help Groups and Other Group Pro-
cedures for Treating Alcohol Problems, in TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF ALCOHOL
PROBLEMS: A RESOURCE MANUAL 157, 171 (W. Miles Cox ed., 1987).
4. Jones, 1993 WL 719562, at *2.
5. See id.
6. In 1995, 1,033,280 DUI arrests were made.  See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1995: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 211 (1996).
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DUI offenders.7  To satisfy the treatment requirement, convicted
drunk drivers may have to participate in self-help programs such as
AA.  Thus, for some convicted drunk drivers, the successful comple-
tion of a self-help program may stave off a prison stay or lessen the
severity of probation terms.  In addition to those who must partici-
pate in rehabilitation programs as a condition of probation, prisoners
are sometimes confronted with trying decisions regarding alcohol-
related self-help programs.  Prisoners are often granted a choice be-
tween participation in such programs and foregoing benefits such as
visitation rights and earlier parole.
In numbers and methodology, AA reigns supreme in the self-
help world. Most substance abuse self-help programs that are not of-
ficially part of AA are, nevertheless, based on AA’s system of recov-
ery which employs religious tenets and prayer. Since its inception in
the 1930s, AA has spawned more than one hundred derivative
groups, including such self-help programs as Gamblers Anonymous
and Narcotics Anonymous.8  According to AA’s own statistics, there
are over 50,000 support groups with over 1.1 million members in the
United States.9  AA has a substantial presence in correctional facili-
ties; more than 2000 AA groups are located in penal institutions in
North America.10  Because AA relies on religious practices in its
treatment of people with drinking problems,11 state-imposed partici-
pation in AA and, more generally, government support of AA raises
significant constitutional issues under the Establishment Clause.12
7. See generally AMERICAN INS. ASS’N, DIGEST OF STATE LAWS RELATING TO DRIVING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL passim (1986); NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS
105-21 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 2d ed. 1997).
8. See ERNEST KURTZ, A.A.: THE  STORY 191 (1988).
9. See Alcoholics Anonymous World Servs., Inc., Membership (visited Oct. 26, 1997)
<http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/factfile/doc07.html>.
10. See id.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  While this Note deals primarily with the re-
lationship between AA and the Establishment Clause, state-directed participation in AA may
also be unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause, which states that “Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion],” U.S. CONST. amend. I, and the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions, which provides that the “government may not grant a
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the gov-
ernment may withhold that benefit altogether.”  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989).  For further discussion of mandatory participation
in AA in light of the Free Exercise Clause, see infra note 351.  The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, as it relates to mandatory AA participation, is discussed in Part V, infra.
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The increasing use of AA as an instrument of rehabilitation by
state judicial and penal systems has encouraged debate over whether
to include participation in AA as a probationary condition or as part
of a prison’s rehabilitative regime.  Many Americans believe that
groups such as AA benefit society.  A number of factors contribute
to this conclusion: Americans have become more familiar with and
increasingly reliant on support groups,13 more interested in the role of
personal responsibility in the amelioration of social problems,14 and
more frustrated with crime.15 In addition, Americans—a very relig-
ious people16—are increasingly willing to employ religious means to
achieve secular ends.  In turn, support groups are impacting religion
in America.  One commentator has posited that the contours of
Americans’ religious beliefs are being transformed and informed by
support groups; he describes the proliferation of support groups as
“redefining how Americans think about the sacred.”17
Members of Congress have demonstrated their willingness to use
alternative and novel solutions to endemic social problems with the
proposed American Community Renewal Act of 1997, sponsored by
Rep. J.C. Watts (R-Okla.) and Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.).18
13. See Anthony Lewis, Are We Joiners or Losers, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 27, 1995,
at A7 (citing a 1994 Gallup poll that found 40% of Americans are members of support groups).
14. Emblematic of this trend, two recent mass rallies in Washington, D.C., the Million
Man March, see R.W. Apple, Jr., The March on Washington, Ardor and Ambiguity, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at A1, and the Promise Keepers gathering, see Michael Reagan, Promises
and Commitment, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at B3, stressed the role of personal responsibility
in remedying social ills.
15. In a New York Times/CBS News Poll conducted in the fall of 1994, more Americans
(23%) ranked crime as the “the most important problem facing this country today” than any
other issue.  Katharine Q. Seelye, The 1994 Campaign, Voters Disgusted with Politicians as
Election Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at  A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. The United States is a religious country; 94% of Americans believe in God or a Uni-
versal Spirit.  See GALLUP ORG., RELIGION IN AMERICA 1992-1993: GALLUP REPORT 18
(1993) (“The proportion of Americans saying they believe in God or a universal spirit has
ranged from 94-99 percent over the years, with the rate holding constant at about 94 percent in
recent years.”).
17.  ROBERT WUTHNOW, SHARING THE JOURNEY: SUPPORT GROUPS AND AMERICA’S
NEW QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 16 (1994).
18. S. 432, 105th Cong. (1997).  For an outline of the American Community Renewal Act
of 1997 and remarks by its lead sponsor in the Senate, see 143 CONG. REC. S2206-02, S2212-14
(daily ed. Mar. 12, 1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham). The Act was first introduced in the
House in May 1996.  See H.R. 3467, 104th Cong. (1996).  When the Act was first introduced,
proponents emphasized the partnership it would create between the state and religious institu-
tions in the fight against substance abuse.  See 142 CONG. REC. H4908 (daily ed. May 14, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Chabot).  Utah Sen. Orrin Hatch explained in the Congressional Record
that the Act would “allow . . . neighborhood groups, including religious institutions, the same
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The Act would provide for taxpayer funding of religious treatment
programs that require clients “to actively participate in religious
practice, worship, and instruction.”19  By ordering states to “treat re-
ligious education and training of personnel as having a critical and
positive role in the delivery of program services,”20 the Act may have
the effect of overriding state licensing standards for substance abuse
counselors.21  Perceiving the perilous entanglement between church
and state that the Act portends, disparate groups such as the Ameri-
can Baptist Churches USA, B’Nai B’rith, and the National Associa-
tion of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors have all registered
their opposition to the legislation.22  Perhaps this opposition is
founded at least in part on the often overlooked justification for the
Establishment Clause that Roger Williams, the founder of the colony
of Rhode Island, first proffered—that the separation of church and
state exists to protect the religious from the secular as much as to
protect the secular from the religious.23
Several courts have addressed government involvement with AA
as part of the rehabilitative functions of state probationary and penal
systems.  These courts have found an Establishment Clause violation
in connection with government support of AA only when an individ-
ual has been coerced into participating.24  Because the Supreme Court
has observed that the presence of coercion is sufficient for an Estab-
access to federal funds that is enjoyed by other drug treatment and counseling facilities.” 142
CONG. REC. S9024 (daily ed. July 29, 1996).  Supporters hope passage of the Act will end
“[d]iscrimination against effective religiously based programs.”  Id.  They contend that
“[t]axpayer funding for drug treatment should be tied strictly to results . . . [and that] religiously
based programs should be eligible for funding.”  Id.
19. H.R. 3467, § 582(g)(2)(A).
20. Id. § 585(b)(i).
21. See Charles Levendosky, Double-Barreled Bad Idea Should Be Shot Down Pronto: Bill
Would Fund Religious Institutions and Mandate Religion in Substance Abuse Counseling, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Aug. 2, 1996, at 15A (observing that the bill has a provision that
may exempt substance abuse counselors affiliated with religious organizations from state edu-
cational requirements).
22. See id.
23. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 6 (1965) (noting Roger Williams’s
view that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wil-
derness [are] not maintained”); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (stating that
the “union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion”);
James Madison, Government and Religion Must Be Separate, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 299,
309 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) (stating that “[r]eligion flourishes in greater purity, without
than with the aid of Gov[ernment]”).
24. See infra Parts II & III.
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lishment Clause infringement,25 these courts, with respect to individ-
ual claimants, are correct to emphasize coercion.  But they are wrong
to require coercion as a necessary element of an Establishment
Clause claim.  By making imperative a finding of coercion, the Es-
tablishment Clause is rendered a “virtual nullity,”26 as the Free Exer-
cise Clause exists to protect individuals from governmental religious
compulsion.  While the Free Exercise Clause focuses on the relation-
ship between the individual and government, the Establishment
Clause is primarily concerned with the relationship between religion
and government.  In particular, the Establishment Clause was
“intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’”27
Over the years, the Supreme Court has worked assiduously to pre-
vent the intermingling of religion and the state by striking down gov-
ernment policies and actions that advance religion.28  In light of the
longstanding emphasis on the separation of religion and government
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, those courts that have con-
sidered government involvement with AA and require the presence
of coercion in order to find an Establishment Clause violation possess
an unduly restrictive view of the Clause.  By disregarding the princi-
ple of separation of religion and the state, these courts allow for un-
constitutional government support of religion.
With these larger issues in mind, this Note explores the constitu-
tionality of state-mandated participation in AA and, more generally,
government involvement with AA.  Part I examines the religious as-
pects of the AA system, considers whether AA falls under the consti-
tutional definition of religion, and discusses the current Establish-
ment Clause tests employed by the Supreme Court.  Part II surveys
cases which have considered the constitutionality of AA as a proba-
tionary condition.  Part III addresses the conditioning of prisoner
privileges on participation in AA.  Special attention is paid to the oft-
asserted rationale that making a right contingent on participation in
AA is reasonably related to the legitimate state penological interest
in rehabilitation of prisoners and, therefore, constitutional.  Part IV
argues that courts which focus on coercion in analyzing government
involvement with AA allow for unconstitutional relationships be-
25. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 621 (Souter, J., concurring).
27. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
28. See infra text accompanying note 57.
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tween the state and AA to persist.  It next contends that the constitu-
tionally sound framework of analysis for state involvement with AA
is the principle of the separation of church and state, rather than the
coercion standard.  This Part concludes with a discussion of taxpayer-
funding of religious organizations that provide counseling services.
Finally, Part V contends that state-imposed participation in AA is
more appropriately considered outside the ambit of the Establish-
ment Clause.  To this end, Part V addresses mandatory AA participa-
tion under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
I. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION
OF RELIGION, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Religious Aspects of Alcoholics Anonymous
Although it is often referred to as a secular organization, AA has
its roots in Christianity.  Bill Wilson and Robert Smith, the founders
of AA, were strongly influenced by the teachings of the Oxford
Group, a religious organization that advocated a return to the ethos
of early Christianity, with a particular emphasis on its aggressive
evangelicalism.29  Nondenominational and theologically conservative,
the Oxford Group was formed in Britain in the early twentieth cen-
tury and reached its peak in the late 1920s and early 1930s.30  The Ox-
ford Group’s principles of admitting fault and seeking recovery
through God form the basis of AA’s philosophy;31 indeed the lineage
of each of AA’s Twelve Steps can be traced to the teachings of the
Oxford Group.32
The chief text in the AA canon is The Big Book,33 which contains
interpretive analyses of AA’s principles of recovery as well as the
29. See KURTZ, supra note 8, at 50.
30. See id. at 9, 48.
31. See CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: CULT OR CURE? 36-39 (1991).  His-
torian Ernest Kurtz contends that AA’s practices were “directly and consciously derived” from
the “Five Procedures”—meant to recapture the spirit of primitive Christianity—of the Oxford
Group: “(1) to give in to God; (2) to listen to God’s directions; (3) to check guidance; (4) resti-
tution; and (5) sharing” one’s sins for the benefit of others.  KURTZ, supra note 8, at 49.  For
the authoritative scholarly treatment of the Oxford Group, see WALTER H. CLARK, THE
OXFORD GROUP: ITS HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE (1951).
32. See BUFE, supra note 31, at 41.
33. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: THE
STORY OF HOW MANY THOUSANDS OF MEN AND WOMEN HAVE RECOVERED FROM
ALCOHOLISM (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter THE BIG BOOK].
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personal stories of selected members.  The Big Book also sets forth
the Twelve Steps, which form the foundation of AA’s system of re-
covery34 and are routinely recited at AA meetings:
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had
become unmanageable.
2.  Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could re-
store us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of
God as we understood Him.
4.  Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5.  Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the
exact nature of our wrongs.
6.  Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of
character.
7.  Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8.  Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to
make amends to them all.
9.  Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except
when to do so would injure them or others.
10.  Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong
promptly admitted it.  
11.  Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious
contact with God as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge
of His will for us and the power to carry that out.
12.  Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we
tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these princi-
ples in all our affairs.35
In addition to reciting the Twelve Steps at AA meetings, members
frequently engage in group prayer.36
34. See G. AIKEN TAYLOR, A SOBER FAITH: RELIGION AND ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
45 (1953).  Taylor characterizes the Twelve Steps as the “creed” of AA, and asserts that they
serve a similar role for AA as the Nicene Creed does for the Christian faith.  See id.
35. THE BIG BOOK, supra note 33, at 59-60.
36. See Thoreson & Budd, supra note 3, at 166; see also Warner v. Orange County Dep’t
of Probation, 870 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that AA sessions attended by plain-
tiff opened with the Serenity Prayer and closed with the Lord’s Prayer), aff’d, 115 F.3d 1068
(1997); O’Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 306 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that AA meet-
ing closed with the Lord’s Prayer); Ron Gasbarro, Another Road to Recovery: A New Group
Offers Alternative to Alcoholics Anonymous, WASH. POST, May 14, 1991, at D5 (quoting a for-
mer AA participant as stating: “[t]hey [AA] made us say the Lord’s Prayer”).  The Serenity
Prayer asks God to “[g]rant [believers] the serenity to accept the things we cannot change,
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In his writings on AA, Bill Wilson, the chief scribe of the organi-
zation, posits religion as the wellspring of AA’s founding principles.
Wilson, in a manner not unlike St. Augustine,37 relates the key to the
beginning of his recovery as a willingness “to believe in a Power
greater than [himself]” and to “turn in all things to the Father of
Light who presides over us all.”38  He continues:
As soon as we admitted the possible existence of a Creative Intelli-
gence, a Spirit of the Universe underlying the totality of things, we
began to be possessed of a new sense of power and direction, pro-
vided we took other simple steps.  We found that God does not
make too hard terms with those who seek Him.
. . . .
Instead of regarding ourselves as intelligent agents, spearheads
of God’s ever advancing Creation, we agnostics and atheists chose to
believe that our human intelligence was the last word, the alpha and
the omega, the beginning and end of all.  Rather vain of us, wasn’t
it?
courage to change the things we can, and the wisdom to know the difference.”  See THE BIG
BOOK, supra note 33, at 382.  The Lord’s Prayer reads:
Our Father who art in heaven,
Hallowed be thy name,
Thy kingdom come,
Thy will be done,
On earth as it is in heaven.
Give us today our daily bread;
And forgive us our debts,
As we also have forgiven our debtors;
And lead us not into temptation,
But deliver us from evil.
Matthew 6:9-13 (Revised Standard Version).
37. St. Augustine documented his lifelong search for a theistic religion and discovery of
God in Confessions.  SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS (Henry Chadwick trans., 1991) (c. 400
A.D.).  Before relating his final, rapturous conversion to Christianity, Augustine discussed his
earlier surrender to worldly temptations: “[I]n my unlovely state I plunged into those lovely
created things which you made.  You were with me, and I was not with you.  The lovely things
kept me far from you.”  Id. at 201.  Augustine found God by turning away from secular excess
and paying heed to God’s persistent call: “You called and cried out loud and shattered my
deafness.  You were radiant and resplendent, you put to flight my blindness. . . . You touched
me, and I am set on fire to attain that peace which is yours.”  Id.
The necessity of conversion and submission for recovery is prevalent in AA literature
and philosophy.  Ernest Kurtz, a historian of AA, regards conversion, or what Bill Wilson liked
to call “deflation,” as a core AA idea.  KURTZ, supra note 8, at 23.  He notes the profound in-
fluence that the religious philosophy of William James had on Wilson; Wilson was particularly
influenced by James’s ruminations on conversion in The Varieties of Religious Experience.  See
id. at 23-24 & nn. 51-53.
38. THE BIG BOOK, supra note 33, at 12, 14.
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We, who have traveled this dubious path, beg you to lay aside
prejudice, even against organized religion.  We have learned that
whatever the human frailties of various faiths may be, those faiths
have given purpose and direction to millions.  People of faith have a
logical idea of what life is all about.39
Some of Wilson’s other writings further depict the injection of mono-
theistic religious influence into AA.  He discusses the need to enlist
God in the struggle against alcoholism: “It was evident that a solitary
self-appraisal . . . wouldn’t be nearly enough.  We’d have to have out-
side help if we were surely to know and admit the truth about our-
selves—the help of God.”40
Not only can God help an individual to fight alcoholism, God
also has a role in the AA movement itself as Divine Protector:
[W]e decided that hereafter in this drama of life, God was going to
be our Director.  He is the Principal; we are His agents.  He is the
Father, and we are His children.  Most good ideas are simple, and
this concept was the keystone of the new and triumphant arch
through which we passed to freedom.41
In addition to infusing Judeo-Christian tenets into the principles of
AA,42 Wilson posited the AA group in which individuals participate
as a religious entity.43  According to AA philosophy, disbelievers who
first accept the AA group as a higher power are more likely eventu-
ally to embrace monotheistic principles.44
39. Id. at 46, 49.
40. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., AS BILL SEES IT 248 (1967)
[hereinafter AS BILL SEES IT].
41. THE BIG BOOK, supra note 33, at 62; see also Bill W., When A.A. Came of Age, in
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE 48 (Bill W. ed., 1957) (stating that “[t]he con-
science of Alcoholics Anonymous as moved by the guidance of God” assures the future of the
organization).
42. In an extensive treatment of the shared themes of Christianity and AA, one observer
has noted that within the Twelve Steps one can discern “[v]irtually every major Christian
truth.” TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 59.  The commentator further contends that the triumphs of
AA are derived not from discovery of something new; rather, to serve in the battle against al-
coholism, the founders of AA incorporated Christianity’s “key to successful living: dependence
upon God.”  Id. at 72.
43. See AS BILL SEES IT, supra note 40, at 73, 191 (observing that for many initiates to AA
the group itself is the higher power).
44. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE
TRADITIONS 107-09 (13th ed. 1983) [hereinafter TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS].
Wilson elaborates on the progression of AA initiates from believing in their self-help group as
a higher power to believing in God:
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Notwithstanding the permeation of its methodology and texts
with references to God, prayer, and salvation, AA refuses to be char-
acterized as a religion.  The Big Book specifically disclaims affiliation
with any “faith, sect, or denomination.”45  Nevertheless, AA does
stress the spiritual nature of its program.46
B. Alcoholics Anonymous and the Constitutional Definition of
Religion
To determine if government involvement with AA violates the
Establishment Clause, it is first necessary to ascertain whether AA is
For the time being, we who were atheist or agnostic discovered that our own group,
or A.A. as a whole, would suffice as a higher power. . . . Looking at those who were
only beginning and still doubted themselves, the rest of us were able to see the
change setting in.  From great numbers of such experiences, we could predict that the
doubter who still claimed that he hadn’t got the “spiritual angle,” and who still con-
sidered his well-loved A.A. group the higher power, would presently love God and
call Him by name.
Id. at 107-09.
45. THE BIG BOOK, supra note 33, at xiv.  For cases which accept AA’s disavowal of re-
ligiosity, see, for example, Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (accepting
AA’s disavowal of religiosity because the AA literature “unequivocally states that the refer-
ences do not reflect any concept of organized religion”); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857,
1993 WL 719562, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993) (accepting the assertion that in Iowa’s Oper-
ating While Intoxicated program, which is based on AA, “clients who do not believe in God
are offered alternatives to expressing a belief in God, so that they can complete the program”);
Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that AA does not consti-
tute a religion); Griffin v. Coughlin, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding
that the inclusion of AA’s Twelve Steps in a prison’s substance abuse program did not make
the program a religious exercise); and State v. McGill, 442 S.E.2d 166, 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(concluding that AA is a “support group for recovering alcoholics” and is “reasonably related”
to defendant’s rehabilitation).
46. The Big Book, in a section entitled “Spiritual Experience,” discusses at great length
the significance of spirituality in AA’s program of recovery:
The terms “spiritual experience” and “spiritual awakening” are used many times in
this book which, upon careful reading, shows that the personality change sufficient to
bring about recovery from alcoholism has manifested itself among us in many differ-
ent forms.
. . . .
. . . With few exceptions our members find that they have tapped an unsus-
pected inner resource which they presently identify with their own conception of a
Power greater than themselves.
Most of us think this awareness of a Power greater than ourselves is the es-
sence of spiritual experience. Our more religious members call it “God-
consciousness.”
. . . .
We find that no one need have difficulty with the spirituality of the program.
Willingness, honesty and open mindedness are the essentials of recovery.
THE BIG BOOK, supra note 33, at 569-70.
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a religion for constitutional purposes.  Although most of the Supreme
Court’s pronouncements on the constitutional definition of religion
have resulted from disputes about Free Exercise claims, there is only
one definition of religion for constitutional purposes.47  The constitu-
tional definition of religion encompasses “all sincere religious beliefs
which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all
else is subordinated or upon which all else is ultimately dependent
[and] which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by [ ] God.”48 In order to be deemed religious for constitutional
47. The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the question of whether there
should be distinct constitutional definitions of religion for analysis under the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses.  That the Court has never squarely considered this issue, despite nu-
merous calls for it to do so, weighs heavily against the notion that a bipartite definition of re-
ligion exists.  In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Rutledge disputed, in dicta, the propri-
ety of this notion.  See 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  He stated that the word
“[r]eligion appears only once in the [First] Amendment” and that it does not possess “two
meanings, one narrow to forbid an establishment and another, much broader, for securing the
free exercise thereof.” Id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Al-
though it has been recognized that considerable tension arises between the Religion Clauses
when the constitutional definition of religion is the same for both, see, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 415-17 (1963); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6,
at 1183-88 (2d ed. 1988); WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1102-03 (2d ed. 1995), the Court has not seen fit to develop Clause-specific defini-
tions of religions.  Instead, the Court has interpreted the Religion Clauses differently to reflect
their distinct purposes:  The Court views the Free Exercise Clause expansively, to favor gov-
ernment accommodation of an individual’s religious practices, while it interprets the Estab-
lishment Clause narrowly, to circumscribe government propagation of religion.  See Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 685, 695 (1992).  The Court’s different modes of interpretation for the Religion
Clauses minimizes the need for a bifurcated definition of religion.  Indeed, the Court has noted
the complementary nature of the Religion Clauses.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972) (stating that the First Amendment “specifically and firmly fix[es] the right to free exer-
cise of religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right [is] an equally firm, even if less
explicit, prohibition against the establishment of any religion by government”).
48. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).  Seeger represents the culmination of
the long evolution of the constitutional definition of religion.  In early cases the Court defined
religion in monotheistic terms.  See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)
(characterizing religion as “one’s views of his relations to his Creator”); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (referring to Thomas Jefferson’s belief that religion is “a matter
which lies safely between man and his God” (citation omitted)). In 1961, the Court broadened
the constitutional definition of religion to include nontheistic religions.  See Torasco v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (extending constitutional recognition of religion to nontheistic
religions, including “Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture [and] Secular Humanism”).  Justice
Harlan argued that the constitutional definition of religion in Seeger should be expanded fur-
ther, to include strongly held moral views.  See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-59
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (contending that intensity of moral conviction, rather than an
arbitrary constitutional line between religion and nonreligion, should be dispositive in argu-
ments for exemption from the draft).
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purposes, the belief “need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others.”49  Observers have interpreted the afore-
mentioned language very broadly to encompass any belief system
that relies on a “higher reality”50 or a “transcendental reality.”51
To determine whether AA is a religion under the Establishment
Clause, courts cannot defer to AA’s definition of itself.52  Instead,
courts must examine the nature of the organization in practice.53  Par-
ticipation in the AA system entails participation in activity that under
Supreme Court precedent must be characterized as religious.  Fur-
ther, an examination of AA literature reveals that its dominant
Commentators agree that no bright line exists between religious and secular belief sys-
tems for constitutional purposes.  See, e.g., Jesse Choper, Defining Religion in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 604 (stating that it is “very difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish transcendental ideologies from those commonly considered to be based on secular
premises”); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of
“Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1565 (1983) (stating that “[t]here simply is no essence of relig-
ion, no single feature or set of features that all religions have in common and that distinguishes
religion from everything else”); Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious
and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 837, 848-73 (1995) (examining the attempted separation of the religious and secular in
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
49. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).  Moreover, Establishment Clause
claimants do not have to prove the truth of their beliefs.  The Court has stated “[m]en may be-
lieve what they cannot prove.  They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs.”  United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
50. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753,
805 (1984) (contending that the presence of a “higher reality,” that is, the “faith that some
higher or deeper reality exists than that which can be established by ordinary existence or sci-
entific observation,” should be decisive when determining whether a belief system falls under
the constitutional definition of religion).
51. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41
STAN. L. REV. 233, 240, 285-86 (1989) (arguing that religion is characterized for constitutional
purposes by the role “transcendental reality plays in imposing obligations” on believers).
52. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.  Even if courts erroneously rely on AA’s
self-description that it is “spiritual” rather than “religious” in determining whether it is a relig-
ion for constitutional purposes, courts should still find that AA is a religion.  If the AA group
itself is a higher power, as its co-founder contends, see supra text accompanying notes 43-44,
courts should  find that AA participation is a religious exercise.
53. For example, in Meek v. Pittinger, the Supreme Court invalidated a Pennsylvania loan
program of instructional material and equipment “earmarked for secular purposes” and avail-
able to both public and nonpublic schools.  421 U.S. 349, 363-66 (1975).  The Court found that
it “would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate secular educational functions from the
predominantly religious role performed by many of Pennsylvania’s church-related elementary
and secondary schools and to then characterize . . . [the statute] as channeling aid to the secular
without providing direct aid to the sectarian.”  Id. at 365; see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in public school classrooms had no secular legislative purpose, regardless of the
state’s insistence that the statute served a secular end).
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theme reflects elements common to most theistic religions.54  Thus,
despite AA’s assertions of secular allegiances and its disavowal of
any intent to impose a particular concept of God on participants,
courts should conclude that AA is a religion.  And several prominent
courts have done so, including the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Second and Seventh Circuits and the New York Court of Ap-
peals.55 AA, monotheistic in its creed and dogmatic in its practice,
shares those traits which characterize organized religion today.56
C. Establishment Clause Tests
1.  The Separation of Church and State.  For over fifty years the
Supreme Court has stressed the separation of church and state as the
foundation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  This principle of
separation “relate[s] primarily to institutional political arrangements,
rather than to the effects such arrangements have on individual
citizens.”57 The principle of separation embraces the ideal of the
secular state, in which religion and government are segregated to
ensure that the former flourishes freely while the latter is not
theocratic.
The test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman58 has served for over
twenty-five years as the governing standard for determining whether
a government practice violates the Establishment Clause.  The
Lemon test addresses government support of religious institutions,
and rests on the principle of separation of church and state.  In
Lemon, the Court examined the constitutionality of state-funding
programs that provided aid to sectarian schools by reimbursing the
cost of textbooks, instructional material, and teachers’ salaries in cer-
tain secular subjects.59  To assist in its determination of whether this
54. See supra Part I.A.
55. See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1075 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding AA meetings that began and ended with group prayer to be “intensely religious
events”); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prison’s Narcotics
Anonymous Twelve Step drug-treatment program was based on monotheistic tenets); Griffin v.
Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 102 (N.Y. 1996) (concluding that AA possesses elements such as be-
lief in a Supreme Being and religious proselytizing), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 336-44 (discussing AA’s status as a “pervasively
sectarian” organization).
57. Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
463, 463.
58. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
59. See id. at 606-07.
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government practice violated the Establishment Clause, the Court
laid out a three-part test.  In order to be deemed constitutional, the
action: 1) must have a “secular legislative purpose;”60 2) must have a
“principal or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion;”61 and 3) “must not foster an excessive governmental entan-
glement with religion.”62  In Lemon, the Court struck down the con-
tested state programs, finding that they promoted excessive
entanglement between religion and government.63
Because of its elasticity,64 Lemon’s three-part test has left Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence in a state of chaos.65  This muddle has
led the Court to disregard the Lemon test on occasion,66 and to fash-
ion alternative tests.67  Indeed, recent Establishment Clause cases
have referred to Lemon only in passing.68 One observer has noted
that seven members of the current Court have disassociated them-
selves from Lemon.69  Nevertheless, despite criticism from several
60. Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
61. Id. (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 613 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
63. See id. at 615.
64. See Michael A. Berg, The Religious Right, Constitutional Values, and the Lemon Test,
1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 73 (stating that the Lemon test’s inconsistency results in large
measure from “uncertainty as to whether the presence of any legitimate secular purpose will
satisfy the Establishment Clause, or whether the actual or primary purpose of the legislation
must be secular”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gey, supra note 57, at 469 (“Because of
Lemon’s slippery nature, the slightest factual distinction makes each Establishment Clause case
a whole new ball game.”).
65. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia have been especially critical of Lemon.  See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the “Lemon
test has caused this Court to fracture into unworkable plurality opinions”); Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (remarking that the application of the
Lemon test has made a “maze of the Establishment Clause”).
66. See McConnell, supra note 47, at 696-708 (noting the increasing irrelevance of
Lemon); John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Con-
stitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 425-30 (1996) (examining the movement
toward “multiple principles” in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
67. See infra notes 71-79, 81-92 and accompanying text.
68. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995)
(relying on principle of government neutrality towards religion); Board of Educ. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 697, 703-04 (1994) [hereinafter Kiryas Joel] (holding that the creation of a special
school district for a religious enclave violated the Establishment Clause principle that the gov-
ernment may not exhibit “favoritism” toward any religious sects).  But see Agostini v. Felton,
117 S. Ct. 1997, 2014-18 (1997) (employing the “excessive entanglement” prong of the Lemon
test to uphold a New York statute which provided indirect aid to religious schools).
69. See Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Re-
ligion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 328 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
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members of the Court, Lemon has not been overruled.70  Although
the Court’s application of the Lemon test has not resulted in a secular
state shorn of religious influence, the test’s guiding principle is that
religion and government, at their most basic levels, are incompatible.
Lemon’s raison d’être is often overlooked as it is vilified by justices
and their academic supporters.
Justice O’Connor has been especially critical of Lemon, urging
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence be “freed from the Lemon
test’s rigid influence.”71  Justice O’Connor’s frustration with Lemon
led her to discuss an alternative approach that focuses on government
endorsement of religion in Lynch v. Donnelly:72 “[Government] en-
dorsement [of religion] sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.  Disapproval sends the opposite
message.”73  Justice O’Connor’s recognition of the dangers of gov-
ernment endorsement of religion is consistent with the principle of
separation.  Indeed, Justice O’Connor proposed the endorsement test
as a clarification of the Lemon test.74  She recast the purpose and ef-
fect prongs of Lemon in terms of perception: “The purpose prong of
the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose is to en-
dorse or disapprove of religion.  The effect prong asks whether, irre-
spective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in
fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.”75
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,76 the Supreme Court formally
adopted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement inquiry as an Establish-
ment Clause test.77  The endorsement test considers whether a
“reasonable observer” would view the challenged governmental prac-
Breyer, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas have distanced themselves from
Lemon).
70. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 n.7
(1993). One commentator has noted that the Court’s refusal to overrule Lemon “reflects its
unwillingness to legitimize the sectarian political culture” that the critics of the principle of
separation supposedly desire.  Gey, supra note 57, at 471.
71. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 721 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
72. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
74. See id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
76. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
77. See id. at 593.
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tice as conveying a message of religious endorsement.78  While mem-
bers of the Court differ over the level of knowledge that should be
attributed to the reasonable observer, most justices who favor the
endorsement test would ascribe a collective knowledge of community
history to the reasonable observer.79
Although the endorsement test has been employed primarily in
cases involving the constitutionality of public religious displays, the
Court has not proscribed its use in other contexts.  Lower courts, for
example, have found the endorsement test helpful in examining the
constitutionality of school prayer and state religious holidays.80
78. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778-79 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
79. See id. at 780-81 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The endorsement test is not without its critics.  Among members of the Court, Justice Kennedy
is most skeptical, regarding the test as overinclusive.  See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670-
71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that few national historical traditions that recognize the
part religion plays in our society could withstand scrutiny under the endorsement test).  On the
other hand, Justice Stevens regards the endorsement test as underinclusive.  While he agrees
that the standard is that of the “reasonable observer,” Justice Stevens contends that the quan-
tum of knowledge attributed to the reasonable observer should not be based on collective
community standards.  See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He would find an
Establishment Clause breach “[i]f a reasonable person could perceive a government endorse-
ment of religion.”  Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Like Justice Stevens, Profes-
sor Tribe regards the collective community knowledge “reasonable observer” standard as in-
sufficient to restrict government support of religion.  See TRIBE, supra note 47, § 14-15, at 1293.
Professor Tribe contends that the proper perspective is that of the “reasonable non-adherent,”
id. § 14-15, at 1295-96, which is necessary to counter majoritarian pressures:
When deciding whether a state practice makes someone feel like an outsider,
the result often turns on whether one adopts the perspective of an outsider or that of
an insider.  Judges must recognize the range of possible responses and cannot avoid
selecting among them.  For many adherents of the majority’s religion . . . the en-
dorsement threshold is quite high.  But the opposite extreme also presents problems.
For some especially sensitive non-adherents, the threshold may be unacceptably low
and may cast doubt on free exercise accommodations and on practices that have out-
grown their religious roots.
It seems clear that, in deciding whether a government practice would imper-
missibly convey a message of endorsement, one should adopt the perspective of a
non-adherent; actions that reasonably offend non-adherents may seem so natural and
proper to adherents as to blur into the background noise of society.
Id. § 14-15, at 1293 (footnotes omitted).
80. See, e.g., Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996)
(applying the endorsement test to a state statute that permitted students to initiate prayers at
various compulsory and noncompulsory events); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977
F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1992) (employing endorsement test to determine the constitutionality of
prayer at high school graduation ceremony); Koenick v. Felton, 973 F. Supp. 522, 527 (D. Md.
1997) (using endorsement test to determine whether a state statute authorizing a public school
holiday for Easter violated the Establishment Clause).
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2. The Protection of Individual Religious Liberty.  A second
principle—the protection of individual religious liberty—has also
been emphasized in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, albeit to a
much lesser degree than the principle of separation.  Some justices
and academics have advocated the abandonment or marginalization
of the principle of separation; they urge the Supreme Court to
analyze Establishment Clause cases by assessing the coercive effect
of government actions on an individual’s religious beliefs or
practices.81
Unlike the principle of separation, which seeks to prevent the in-
termingling of church and state, the coercion standard’s guiding prin-
ciple is that government actions that advance religion are permissible
unless such actions coerce an individual to act or believe in confor-
mity with a religion against his will.  Separation of church and state is
no longer an end; rather it is occasionally required as a means to pro-
tect individual religious liberty.  So long as the religious liberties of
individuals remain protected, the coercion standard allows for some
injection of religion into governmental affairs and of the government
into religion.
In Lee v. Weisman,82 the Supreme Court focused not on separa-
tion, but on the protection of individual religious liberty; this change
of focus led to the Court’s announcement of a new Establishment
Clause test that specifically addressed government coercion of indi-
viduals to participate in religious activities.  Under the “coercion”
test, a government practice violates the Establishment Clause if it
compels a person to declare a religious belief or participate in a re-
81. Justices Kennedy, see infra text accompanying notes 82-92, and Scalia, see infra note
92, have most strongly emphasized individual religious liberty in Establishment Clause cases.
In academia, Professors McConnell and Choper are among the staunchest critics of the princi-
ple of separation.  See generally, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980); Michael W. McConnell,
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).  See also
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 34-39, 122-23 (1993) (decrying the “potential transforma-
tion of the Establishment Clause from a guardian of religious liberty into a guarantor of public
secularism,” which would strip religions of their status as autonomous intermediate institutions
between the individual and the state); M.G. “Pat” Robertson, Squeezing Religion Out of the
Public Square—The Supreme Court, Lemon, and the Myth of the Secular Society, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 224 (1995) (criticizing efforts to exclude religious ideals and ideas from
the political and lawmaking process).
82. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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ligion.83  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy opined: “at a mini-
mum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”84  In Lee,
public school officials selected a rabbi to give a “nonsectarian” invo-
cation and benediction at the graduation ceremony.85  Neither the fact
that students could remain silent during the prayer nor the fact that
the prayer was nondenominational persuaded the Court that the ac-
tion was permissible.86  In its analysis, the Court emphasized that, for
the nonbeliever, the innocuous, nonsectarian prayer may appear to
be an exercise of the “machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy”87 rather than a communal expression of shared values.
The Court found the degree of state coercion extremely unset-
tling, even though the prayer lasted for less than two minutes and
students were not required to recite it.  The Court stressed its
“heightened concerns” of psychological and religious coercion in the
school setting.88  It further found that the school district’s supervision
and control of the ceremony and the requirement that students main-
tain respectful silence during the prayer constituted public pressure
to participate, even if the pressure was subtle and indirect.89  Fur-
thermore, given the milieu of a high school graduation ceremony, the
Court noted that silence for some dissenters can connote acceptance
of the prayer or participation itself.90  Objectors are caught between
Scylla and Charybdis; participate in or accept the state’s religious
viewpoint by maintaining respectful silence during the prayer, or pro-
83. See id. at 587.  Although Lee represents the formal pronouncement of the coercion test
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has discussed coercion on numerous prior
occasions in connection with the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 385 (1985) (maintaining that a student’s religious beliefs should be “free of any coercive
pressures from the State”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating the govern-
ment may not “coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take relig-
ious instruction”); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that “[n]o per-
son can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs”).
84. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
85. See id. at 587.
86. See id. at 588-89, 593.
87. Id. at 592.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 593.
90. See id. at 597.
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test and risk uncertain consequences.91  The Court regarded both
choices as unacceptable.92
*         *        *
For centuries, commentators have debated the appropriate
boundaries between church and state.  Professor Stanley Fish has as-
serted that this dialogue “has not advanced one millimeter beyond
the terms established by John Locke”93 over three hundred years ago.
Locke wrote:
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the
business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the
just bounds that lie between the one and the other.  If this be not
done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will always
be arising . . . .94
In response to Locke’s challenge to “settle the just bounds” of
church and state, traditional legal scholars have attempted to expli-
cate the imponderables of the Establishment Clause with intrepid
analyses of the Court’s opinions, seeking to identify patterns that
reconcile irreconcilable results and principles that the Court is sure to
follow in the future.  But, invariably, the Court deviates from pat-
terns and principles as they are identified and the cycle of scholarship
begins anew.  Others have taken a more philosophical bent, empha-
91. See id. at 593.
92. See id. at 586-87.  Justice Scalia, dissenting in Lee, proposed a more robust coercion
standard that does not include psychological coercion.  See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He
would find an Establishment Clause violation only if an individual is legally coerced to act in
accordance with a religion.  See id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing legal coercion
as “coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of pen-
alty”).
In addition to Lemon and the endorsement and coercion tests, the Supreme Court has
adopted a “history and tradition” test to address certain Establishment Clause issues.  In Marsh
v. Chambers, the Court considered whether a state legislature’s policy of opening each of its
legislative sessions with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause.  See 463 U.S. 783, 784
(1983).  The Court held that such practices, extant for over 200 years, are not unconstitutional,
as they are “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”  Id. at 786.  Because
AA participation as a condition of probation or as a requirement for prisoner privilege is not a
practice “deeply embedded” in America’s history or tradition, Marsh is inapposite for the de-
termination of the constitutionality of state-imposed AA participation.
93. Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2258 (1997)
94. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in
JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION IN FOCUS 12 (John Horton & Susan
Mendus eds., 1991)).
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sizing in various fashions the unique definitional, moral, and constitu-
tional problems that religion’s special characteristics engender.  In
the end, the philosophical tack yields no firmer conclusions about the
Court’s decisionmaking process except that it rarely follows the vari-
ous principles set forth by the legal philosophers.  The continuing de-
bate in the wider academy and among members of the Court is tes-
tament to Professor Fish’s assertion that Locke’s challenge has not
adequately been met.
Abstruse philosophical expositions on the relationship between
religion and government are of little solace to judges who have dock-
ets to clear; they cannot afford to be paralyzed by the inscrutability of
the Establishment Clause.  Despite conflicting precedent and rancor
in the academy, judges must decide how to address church-state is-
sues.  This Note contends simply that judges, in choosing the coercion
test, have selected the wrong approach to assess government support
of AA.  The coercion test’s track record since Lee v. Weisman mili-
tates against judges using it as the exclusive means to dispose of AA
cases.  Since its pronouncement, the coercion test has provided the
basis for a Supreme Court Establishment Clause decision in only one
instance.95  In Lee itself, Justices Blackmun and Souter filed concur-
ring opinions, both joined by Justices O’Connor and Stevens, which
emphasized the principle of separation of church and state rather
than the protection of individual religious liberty.96  The rest of this
Note demonstrates why judges who refuse to consider government
involvement with AA in light of the separation principle fail to carry
out the mandate of the Establishment Clause.
II. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AND PROBATION
Trial courts often sentence offenders to probation in lieu of
prison.  Courts impose probation as a sanction for a crime; individu-
95. In a one-sentence memorandum opinion issued the same term Lee was decided, the
Supreme Court vacated a Fifth Circuit decision, which allowed for prayer at a high school
graduation ceremony, and remanded for further consideration in light of Lee.  See Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (mem.), vacating and remanding 930 F.2d
416 (5th Cir. 1991).
96. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 600 (“[The Establishment Clause’s] purpose . . . was to create a
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.”) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 627 (observing that the “principle against
favoritism and endorsement has become the foundation of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence”) (Souter, J., concurring).
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als placed on probation must abide by the conditions set by the court.
If an offender violates his probationary conditions, he can be incar-
cerated following a judicial proceeding.97  Probation conditions are
mainly derived from two sources.  First, statutes may mandate or
suggest probation conditions.  Second, most judges have statutory
authority to devise probation conditions.98  Although the discretion
given to judges is broad, it is not boundless, especially when a proba-
tioner’s constitutional rights are at issue.99  While a probationer’s spe-
cial status diminishes certain of his constitutional rights,100 any restric-
tion must be narrowly drawn to further a legitimate goal of
probation.101  Probation conditions should further the rehabilitation
of the probationer; this purpose has been cited as the primary goal of
rehabilitation.102
Offenders convicted of DUI are frequently eligible for probation
in place of imprisonment.  State drunk driving laws often create a
post-conviction system in which the DUI offender’s alcohol problem
is evaluated for its seriousness.103  After the offender’s alcohol prob-
lem is classified according to statutory guidelines, the probation de-
partment recommends a prescribed rehabilitation program to the
sentencing judge.104  If the offender’s drinking problem meets the
97. See NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE §
1.01, at 4 (1983).  Parole is often confused with probation.  Whereas probation is given in place
of incarceration, an individual is eligible for parole only after serving a portion of his prison
sentence.  See id.  In addition, parole is granted through an administrative procedure rather
than a judicial one.  See id.
98. See id. § 1.04, at 13.
99. See id. § 5.03, at 193 (noting that “[c]onditions constricting constitutionally protected
rights are closely scrutinized by courts”).
100. Cf. United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that a condition of
probation is not “necessarily invalid simply because it affects a probationer’s ability to exercise
constitutionally protected rights”).
101. See United States v. Conseulo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 97, § 1.03, at 9; see also Higdon v. United States,
627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the “primary purpose of probation is to rehabili-
tate the offender”).
103. For a description of Illinois’ statutory post-conviction system to determine the proper
punishment and rehabilitation for a DUI offender, see Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 896-99
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
104. See Christopher K. Smith, Note, State Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First
Amendment and Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation, 1 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 299, 306 (1992).  These rehabilitative programs, in turn, sometimes man-
date participation in self-help programs such as AA in addition to or in satisfaction of the reha-
bilitation requirement of the offender’s sentence.   See Michael G. Honeymar, Jr., Note,  Alco-
holics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation: When Does It Amount to
Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 438 (1997).
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statutory criteria for required participation in AA or a self-help pro-
gram, the probation department further recommends participation in
such a group as a probationary condition to the sentencing judge.105
The court generally follows the probation department’s recommen-
dation.106  Although the sentencing judge remains the final arbiter of
the offender’s probation conditions, the legislature’s imprimatur on
AA participation as a condition of probation is unmistakable.107
Regardless of whether a state has enacted a post-conviction
framework for guilty drunk drivers, offenders may still be compelled
to participate in AA as a probationary condition by sentencing
judges.108  Judges sentencing DUI offenders may specifically impose
AA or may simply require offenders to participate in any number of
state-approved self-help programs.  Judges have been known to ei-
ther require AA participation for every first time DUI offender that
comes before them109 or to mete out such a sentence only for recidi-
vist drunk drivers.110  While there are no statistics bearing on the fre-
quency with which judges specifically impose AA as a probationary
condition for DUI offenders, AA’s status as the dominant self-help
program suggests that it is very high.
Federal courts have twice addressed the constitutionality of re-
quiring AA attendance as a condition of probation.111  In Warner v.
105. In some jurisdictions, a judge’s lack of specificity in setting probation conditions may
be tantamount to a requirement that the drunk driving offender participate in AA because of a
probation department’s preference for AA.  Lacking explicit guidance from the sentencing
judge, the DUI offender’s probation officer will often instruct the probationer to attend AA.
Richard B. Golden, a lawyer representing parties in several challenges to mandatory AA par-
ticipation as a condition of probation, observed that, while alternatives to AA do exist, proba-
tion officials do not think that they are “satisfactory” and, moreover, that it is a “standard con-
dition [throughout the country] that probationers in DWI cases attend AA.”  Frank J. Murray,
Courts Hit Sentencing DWIs to AA, Fault Religious Beliefs, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at A10.
106. See Smith, supra note 104, at 306; see also Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Proba-
tion, 115 F.3d 1068, 1070 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing probation department’s post-conviction
recommendations, including a provision that offender attend AA, that were followed by the
sentencing judge).
107. See Smith, supra note 104, at 307.
108. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 97, § 1.04, at 12.
109. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 104, at 307 (noting a Massachusetts court that sentences
every convicted drunk driver to AA for up to thirty weeks).
110. See, e.g., Jeri Row, DWI Rules Too Lenient, Officials Say, NEWS & RECORD
(Greensboro, N.C.), July 16, 1995, at B1 (reporting that local judges routinely require AA par-
ticipation as a probation condition for habitual drunk drivers).
111. In a less rigorous fashion, an Illinois state court considered whether AA attendance is
constitutional as a condition of probation.  See Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 899 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (holding that AA attendance as a condition of probation is constitutional).
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Orange County Department of Probation,112 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a New York county’s
probation department violated the Establishment Clause under the
coercion test when it required a convicted drunk driver to attend AA
as a condition of probation.113  In O’Connor v. State of California, the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
held that a county’s requirement that a DUI offender attend an alco-
hol treatment program, where AA was the principal recommended
program, did not violate the Establishment Clause under the Lemon
test.114
A. Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation
Robert Warner was convicted of three alcohol-related driving
offenses over slightly more than a year’s time.115  As a condition of his
three-year sentence of probation, Warner was required to “attend
Alcoholics Anonymous at the direction of [his] probation officer.”116
The sentencing judge did not offer any alternative rehabilitation pro-
grams to Warner.  The judge followed the recommendation of the
probation department which, as a matter of policy, specifically rec-
ommends AA therapy to the court for DUI cases.117  A self-described
atheist, Warner filed suit, claiming that mandatory participation in
AA as a probationary condition violated the Establishment Clause.118
Warner alleged that his forced participation in AA was unconstitu-
tional because of AA’s emphasis on God and spirituality in its pro-
112. 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997).
113. See Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075-77.  The Warner case has undergone several iterations.
For the sake of clarity, the district court’s rejection of the probation department’s motion to
dismiss Warner’s section 1983 claim is designated Warner I.  See Warner v. Orange County
Dep’t of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  The district court’s consideration of
the merits of Warner’s section 1983 claim is called Warner II.  See Warner v. Orange County
Dep’t of Probation, 870 F. Supp. 69, 70-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  The Second Circuit’s decision af-
firming the basic holding of Warner II and remanding to determine whether Warner consented
to AA as a condition of probation is referred to as Warner III.  See Warner v. Orange County
Dep’t of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1069-82 (2d Cir. 1997).  The district court’s finding on re-
mand that Warner’s failure to object to required attendance at AA meetings did not constitute
a waiver of his section 1983 claim is designated Warner IV.  See Warner v. Orange County
Dep’t of Probation, 968 F. Supp. 917, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
114. See 855 F. Supp. 303, 303-04 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
115. See Warner I, 827 F. Supp. at 262.
116. Id.
117. See Warner III, 115 F.3d at 1075.
118. See Warner I, 827 F. Supp. at 263.
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gram of recovery.119  He particularly disagreed with the use of a
prayer invoking “the Lord” at the beginning of AA meetings and the
encouragement he received at sessions to read The Big Book.120  He
sought injunctive relief and compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (section 1983).121
In Warner I, the district court held that Warner stated a valid
claim under section 1983 and denied the probation department’s mo-
tion to dismiss.122  Recognizing that the tenuous status of Lemon cau-
tioned against “undue reliance” on it, the court based its decision on
both Lemon and Lee.123  In its application of the coercion test, the
court stated that, because of Warner’s potential confinement, the
pressure to conform to AA’s spiritual system of recovery “seemed
considerably more forceful” than that brought to bear on the school-
children in Lee.124
In Warner II, the district court considered the merits of Warner’s
section 1983 claim.  The court held that the probation condition that
required Warner to participate in AA violated the Establishment
Clause.125  In its analysis, the court abandoned Lemon and relied
solely on Lee, examining whether the probation department’s actions
ran afoul of Lee’s dictate that the “government may not coerce any-
one to support or participate in religion.”126  Because Warner was
faced with incarceration if he did not participate in AA, the court
found that the probation department’s requirement that Warner at-
tend AA was a coercive measure, and therefore that it violated the
Establishment Clause.127
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.  Section 1983 provides redress for any citizen of the United States who is de-
prived of his constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).  Un-
der section 1983, state and local government officials are liable to the injured party in an action
at law, a suit in equity, or any other appropriate proceeding for redress.  See id.
122. See Warner I, 827 F. Supp. at 269.
123. Id. at 266.
124. Id. at 268.
125. See Warner II, 870 F. Supp. 69, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
126. Id. at 72 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
127. See id.  While this determination was sufficient under Lee to find that the state was
acting in a manner that advanced religion, the court also analyzed whether the probation de-
partment’s policy of mandating AA attendance for probationers had the effect of
“establish[ing] a [state] religion or religious faith.” Id.  Significantly, the court stated that the
probation department’s policy, while not intending to establish a religious faith, nevertheless
“tend[ed] towards a state-mandated and state-approved religion” in a stronger manner than
either Lee or County of Allegheny.  Id. at 73.  This tension between the protection of individual
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In Warner III,128 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding in Warner II that Warner’s probationary condition consti-
tuted forced participation in a religious activity.129  The Second Cir-
cuit found that the program which Warner attended “placed a heavy
emphasis on spirituality and prayer, in both conception and in prac-
tice.”130  Observing that participants in the program were told to
“pray to God”131 for succor in their battle against alcoholism and that
meetings began and adjourned with “group prayer,”132 the Second
Circuit had “no doubt” that the meetings Warner attended were
“intensely religious events.”133
The Warner III court next applied the coercion test to Warner’s
claim.  In finding state coercion, the court noted that if Warner had
failed to attend his AA meetings he would have violated his proba-
tion and been subject to incarceration.134  In addition, the court stated
that “[t]he probation department’s policy, its recommendation, and
its printed form all directly recommended A.A. therapy to the sen-
tencing judge, without suggesting that the probationer might have
any option to select another therapy program, free of religious con-
tent.”135  The Second Circuit had little difficulty concluding that War-
ner’s probationary condition violated the Establishment Clause and,
in so doing, rejected alternative Establishment Clause analyses of-
fered by the probation department.136  The court left open the ques-
religious liberty and the more traditional Establishment Clause concern for the separation of
church and state is discussed further in Part IV.A, infra.
128. 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. See id. at 1075, 1077.
130. Id. at 1075 (quoting Warner II, 870 F. Supp. at 71).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 1074-77.  The Warner III court rejected as inapposite the probation depart-
ment’s Marsh v. Chambers analysis, see id. at 1076, and declined to employ Lemon, see id. at
1076 n.8.  The court also refuted the defendant’s assertion that Lee was inapplicable because
the more mature Warner was subjected to less social pressure to participate in religion than the
schoolchildren in Lee.  See id. at 1075-76.  The court argued that Warner was subject to more
pressure than the children in Lee, who were exposed to only two minutes of prayer.  See id. at
1076.  The court stated that:
Warner, in contrast, was required to participate in a long-term program of group
therapy that repeatedly turned to religion as the basis of motivation.  And when he
appeared to be pursuing the Twelve Steps of the A.A. program with insufficient
zeal—“Thirteen Stepping” in A.A. parlance—the probation officer required that he
attend “Step meetings” to intensify his motivation.  Warner was also paired with an-
other member of A.A. as a method of enhancing his indoctrination into the group’s
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tion whether the state would have violated the Establishment Clause
if Warner had been “offered a reasonable choice of therapy provid-
ers.”137
Dissenting in Warner III, Judge Winter argued that a different
result obtains under Lemon.138  Judge Winter attacked the majority’s
Establishment Clause logic as “endanger[ing] any number of ubiqui-
tous penal programs” and threatening sentencing, probation, and pe-
nal institutions. 139  Unlike the majority, Judge Winter refused to focus
exclusively on the coercion test, and instead utilized Lemon.  Judge
Winter found that: 1) the secular purpose prong of the test is easily
met by the state’s legitimate interest in rehabilitating its prisoners; 2)
any advancement of religion is “incidental;” and 3) the large degree
of control the state wields over the lives of inmates justifies its provi-
sion of religious programs in the prison setting.140
Interpreting the record differently from the majority, Judge
Winter concluded that Warner had initially embraced the condition
of probation in the hope that the sentencing court would respond fa-
vorably and be more lenient.  He noted that Warner began attending
AA meetings on the advice of counsel in order to impress the sen-
tencing judge before any involvement by the probation office.141
Judge Winter reasoned that Warner’s proactive stance towards AA
amounted to a waiver of any constitutional claim the probationer
may have had.142  Judge Winter also noted that Warner failed to ob-
approach to recovery from alcoholism.  Most importantly, failure to cooperate could
lead to incarceration.
Id.
137. Id. at 1075.
138. See id. at 1080-81 (Winter, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1080 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter presented prison chaplains and com-
munity service at soup kitchens operated by religious organizations as examples of programs
that would be invalid if the majority’s argument was followed to its logical conclusion.  See id.
(Winter, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 1080-81 (Winter, J., dissenting).  Judge Winter supported his finding of no
excessive government entanglement (the third prong of the Lemon test) with Second Circuit
case law holding that the state is bound to offer “some congregate programs of a sectarian na-
ture.”  Id. at 1081 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
141. See id. at 1078 (Winter, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 1078-79 (Winter, J., dissenting).  The notion that a probationer can waive his
constitutional rights has long been in disrepute.  Early theories characterized probation as an
“act of grace.”  Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (stating that “[p]robation . . . comes as
an act of grace to one convicted of a crime”).  Probation conditions were not reviewable be-
cause the defendant did not have a substantive right to probation.  See id. at 492-93.  The of-
fender could either accept the probation conditions as offered or select the alternative—jail.  In
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ject to the condition at the sentencing hearing and took no appeal; it
was not until after sentencing that Warner complained to his proba-
tion officer about the religious aspects of AA.  Why Warner’s actions
and attitude should be determinative in an Establishment Clause case
is never fully articulated by Judge Winter.143
Judge Winter then criticized the court’s reliance on coercion.  He
noted that while coercion is often a factor in finding an Establish-
ment Clause violation, it is a not necessary factor.  Under Judge Win-
ter’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause, Warner’s preference
for a secular program and the pressure applied to him by the state to
attend a religiously-oriented program is of no moment in ascertaining
the constitutional validity of the program itself:
If attendance at A.A. meetings as a condition of probation
violates the Establishment Clause, it is because such a condition en-
tails governmental sponsorship of religion over nonreligion.  Fol-
lowing the logic of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it would
seem to me that such a condition is a violation whether or not the
only person directly affected, the probationer, preferred a religiously
oriented program over a secular one.144
In sum, according to Judge Winter, a choice between a religiously-
based AA program and alternative secular options would not cure an
Establishment Clause infirmity.145
1973, the Supreme Court repudiated the “act of grace” theory.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) (stating that a probationer cannot be denied due process on the basis
that probation is an “act of grace”).  Despite this disavowal, many lower courts still viewed
probation as a contractual relationship in which the offender waives any objection to the proba-
tion conditions in return for a suspended jail sentence.  See Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation
Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 45, 57-60 (1981).  However, some courts recognized the stark inequities inherent
in a bargain where an offender chooses probation conditions, no matter how repugnant, over
incarceration.  See, e.g., United States v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.
1982) (stating that the choice is “illusory” for a defendant who must accept “arguably imper-
missible conditions of probation or suffer incarceration”).  Congress ended this judicial debate
in 1984 when it passed the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
998 (1994), which provided that probation constitutes a sentence in itself.  See S. REP. NO. 98-
225, at 68 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3251.  This legislative proclamation
made it clear that probation conditions, like prison sentences, are reviewable by the judiciary.
143. Ironically, Judge Winter suggests that a different outcome would result if Warner had
brought a Free Exercise claim.  Judge Winter observes that Warner may have had a viable
Free Exercise claim, noting that compulsory attendance at an activity with a substantial relig-
ious component as part of a penal sentence is constitutionally suspect.  See Warner III, 115 F.3d
at 1081 (Winter, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1080 (Winter, J., dissenting).
145. See id. (Winter, J., dissenting).
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On remand, the district court considered Judge Winter’s conten-
tion that Warner had forfeited his Establishment Clause rights and
determined that Warner’s failure to object to mandatory AA atten-
dance as a condition of probation did not constitute a forfeiture of his
right to bring a section 1983 action.146  The district court observed that
Warner’s inaction may have been “decidedly influenced by the possi-
bility that any objections or non-compliance could lead to a jail sen-
tence or revocation of probation.”147  In addition, the court recog-
nized that Warner’s failure to commence legal proceedings until after
two years of mandatory AA attendance did not constitute a waiver
but resulted from the slow realization that mandatory AA participa-
tion violated his constitutional rights.148  The court’s torturous analy-
sis of Warner’s odyssey from an opportunist AA participant to a pro-
bationer whose atheist convictions were under siege by the state
demonstrates the difficulty in employing approaches like the Lee co-
ercion test, which assess an individual’s subjective motivations, be-
liefs, and responses to government action.
B. O’Connor v. California
In O’Connor v. California,149 the United States District Court for
the Central District of California held that requiring a DUI offender
to attend an alcohol treatment program as a condition of probation
did not violate the Establishment Clause.150  Edward O’Connor was
convicted of DUI.151  As part of his probation, the Orange County
Municipal Court ordered O’Connor to enroll in the county’s alcohol
and drug education program for eighteen months.152  Additionally,
the sentencing court stipulated that O’Connor had to attend weekly
self-help meetings in order to fulfill the county’s additional program
requirement.153  Two self-help programs, AA and Rational Recovery,
146. See Warner IV, 968 F. Supp. 917, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
147. Id. at 923.
148. See id. at 923-24.
149. 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
150. See id. at 304.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.  In addition to requiring DUI offenders to participate in the county’s alcohol
education program, California state law allows counties to institute additional program re-
quirements for convicted drunk drivers.  See id. at 305.  At the time of O’Connor’s conviction,
the “additional program” requirement was loosely defined by state law: “The drinking driver
program shall ensure that a variety of options are available which take into account the unique
needs of each participant.”  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 9860(a) (1992) (amended 1995).  In re-
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were pre-approved by Orange County as meeting the county’s re-
quirements for its “additional program.”154  During O’Connor’s pro-
bation, Rational Recovery, a secular alternative to AA,155 met in Or-
ange County only five times a week; AA meetings were held much
more frequently.  He attended both programs, dividing his time
roughly between them based on their compatibility with his sched-
ule.156  O’Connor filed a motion with the Municipal Court requesting
that the terms of his probation be modified so as not to include par-
ticipation in a self-help program.  O’Connor argued that because of
his circumstances, mandated participation in a self-help program was
tantamount to a requirement to participate in AA.  O’Connor’s mo-
tion was denied on the ground that there was an alternative program
sponse to O’Connor’s finding of a spiritual component in AA, see infra text accompanying
notes 158-59,  the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs recognized the relig-
ious nature of AA, see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 9860(c)(1) (1995) (referring to AA as a
“sectarian” group),  and amended the “additional program” requirement to ensure that reha-
bilitative options would be available to participants who refused to attend AA.  See id. §
9860(c).  A county must inform the participant of nonsectarian alternatives to AA if it lists AA
as a self-help group that a participant can attend to fulfill the additional program requirement.
See id.  § 9860(c)(1).  If these alternatives do not exist, or are not practical or accessible, see id.
§ 9860(c)(2)(B), the county must provide alternatives to self-help group meetings.  See id. §
9860(c).  These alternatives allow participants to satisfy the additional program requirements
through activities such as community service and attendance at DUI-victim panels.  See id. §
9860(b)(2)-(7) (listing alternatives to self-help group meetings).  For a more thorough treat-
ment of California’s response to the O’Connor decision, see Honeymar, supra note 104, at 468-
71.
154. See O’Connor, 855 F. Supp. at 305.  While attendance at these programs is not neces-
sary to comply with the additional program requirement, other treatment approaches must be
specially-approved by the county.  See id.
155. Rational Recovery was founded in 1986 by Jack Trimpey, a social worker who had
become disillusioned with AA.  See Connie Lauerman, Is AA Still the Way?, Those Who Find
the 12 Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous Too Tall an Order May Find These Alternatives More to
Their Liking, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1997, at A1.  Rational Recovery has roughly 600 treatment
centers in the U.S. and Canada which serve less than 10,000 clients.  See Honeymar, supra note
104, at 465 n.132.  Trimpey has criticized the cult-like nature of AA, stating that “[i]t demands
complete devotion from its members.  You must literally turn your life over to the movement
and attend meetings for the rest of your life.”  Lauerman, supra.  Rational Recovery relies on
self-recovery to battle alcoholism, viewing recovery group meetings such as AA as
“unnecessary.”  Frequently Asked Questions About Rational Recovery (visited Nov. 15, 1997)
<http://www.rational.org/recovery/Q%26A.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  Ra-
tional Recovery’s approach involves teaching people how to recognize their addictive voice—
the source of the desire to drink—and how to defeat it.  See Lauerman, supra.  Rational Recov-
ery’s literature describes itself as being “a program that is free from religion” and a home for
people “who have received unwanted, unconstitutional, religious indoctrinations in the course
of addiction treatment.”  Frequently Asked Questions About Rational Recovery, supra.  Ra-
tional Recovery suggests that twelve-step programs are religions and may compete with estab-
lished faiths.  See id.
156. See O’Connor, 855 F. Supp. at 305-06.
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—Rational Recovery—available for him to attend.157  A short time
thereafter, O’Connor filed suit in district court, alleging that Califor-
nia and Orange County’s endorsement and promotion of AA vio-
lated the Establishment Clause.
The O’Connor court began by addressing the religiosity of AA.
The O’Connor court acknowledged that participants in the program
are encouraged to believe in a higher power and that AA was
founded on “monotheistic principles.”158  The court was also aware
that the AA meetings attended by O’Connor ended with participants
holding hands while reciting the Lord’s Prayer.159  Despite the relig-
ious nature of AA and the religious aspects of O’Connor’s own AA
experience, the court found that state endorsement of a program that
merely incorporates God does not give rise to an Establishment
Clause violation.160
Designating Lemon as the “prevailing” test for Establishment
Clause analysis,161 the court applied the three-part test and held that
no constitutional violation had occurred.162  Under Lemon’s first
prong, the court found that the principle and primary effect of the
county’s policy of encouraging participation in AA is to treat sub-
stance abuse, rather than to advance any particular religious belief.163
In examining the second prong of Lemon, the court viewed the pres-
ence of alternatives as significant in determining that the state is not
endorsing AA.164  The court reasoned that the availability of optional
programs foreclosed any state endorsement of the religious message
of AA; it regarded any state involvement with AA as simply ad-
vancing the more general concept of “self-help.”165  Addressing the
third prong of Lemon, the O’Connor court characterized the level of
entanglement between the county and AA as “arms-length,” noting
that AA does not receive any funding from the government and that
the county only recommends the program as a means of fulfilling the
“additional program” requirement.166
157. See id. at 304.
158. See id. at 307-08 & n.6.
159. See id. at 306.
160. See id. at 308.
161. See id. at 306.
162. See id. at 307.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 308.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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C. Incidental Benefits to AA in the Probation Context
For the Warner III and O’Connor courts, the presence or ab-
sence of choice between secular and religiously-oriented self-help
groups was decisive.  In finding an Establishment Clause breach, the
Warner III court stressed that Warner had not been granted a choice
between religious and secular programs.  In O’Connor, the court em-
phasized that O’Connor had the ability to choose a nonreligious sup-
port program instead of AA; this led the court to find no Establish-
ment Clause violation. Thus, according to the Warner III and
O’Connor courts, AA attendance as a probationary condition only
gives rise to an Establishment Clause violation if it is compulsory.
These courts suggest that the absence of mandatory AA attendance
cures any Establishment Clause infirmity associated with probation-
ary conditions that require participation in self-help groups.167  The
necessary implication of this position is that any benefits derived by
AA from arrangements where the state requires participation in a
self-help group are incidental and therefore constitutional.  This
reading of the Establishment Clause is unduly permissive given AA’s
dominance within the self-help field.
On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has stated that
religious organizations may receive attenuated or incidental benefits
from neutral government programs affecting a wide variety of recipi-
ents.168  Therefore, a probation referral system that offered both
secular and religiously-oriented rehabilitation programs to proba-
tioners might not violate the Establishment Clause if the overall sys-
tem were neutral.  Although neutrality is, at best, an ambiguous con-
cept in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,169 a probation referral
167. For further discussion of the relationship between coercion and the Establishment
Clause, see Part IV.A.
168. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997) (holding that a program pro-
viding remedial instruction to children on a neutral basis at sectarian schools by government
employees does not violate the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993) (holding that state funding of a sign-language interpreter for a deaf
student at a sectarian school was permissible as a neutral service); see also Mark E. Chopko,
Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645,
660-65 (1992) (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not foreclose involvement of relig-
ious institutions in public programs or from receiving public funds).
169. See Fish, supra note 93, at 2266 (stating that “neutrality . . . has meaning only within
some particular set of background conditions; as a rule or measure it will always reflect deci-
sions and distinctions it cannot recognize because it unfolds and has applications within them”);
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the ‘No Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 314 (1987) (observing that the “pervasive
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system could only approach constitutional neutrality if, at a mini-
mum, secular self-help programs exist that meet frequently at close
proximity to probationers.  In addition, the state, whether it be in the
form of a sentencing judge or a probation department, must be cog-
nizant of secular alternatives and must not assume that a probation-
ary condition mandating participation in a self-help group requires
participation in AA.  Many probation referral systems, however, ei-
ther do not provide a secular option, or, if they do, they do not en-
dorse it as strongly in word and deed as they support the nonsecular
program (AA).  Although not documented, reasons for the lack of
government support for secular alternatives to AA probably include
AA’s success in treating alcoholics,170 its pervasiveness,171 and its self-
funding policy.172  It is interesting to note that these reasons are prac-
tical: AA’s religious ethos, while perhaps instrumental in its success
and popularity, is probably not a factor that most administrators and
bureaucrats consider when deciding which treatment program to
support.
One commentator has suggested that probation referral systems
that allow the probationer to choose from a range of self-help groups
are analogous to situations where the Supreme Court has allowed in-
direct aid to religion.173  For example, in Witters v. Washington De-
partment of Services for the Blind,174 the Supreme Court found that a
state did not violate the Establishment Clause when it paid a blind
student’s tuition at a Christian college through a generally-applicable
aid program.175  Crucial to the Court’s holding was its distinction be-
tween direct and indirect aid; the Court observed that aid reached
religious institutions “only as a result of the genuinely independent
commitment to neutrality [in Establishment Clause jurisprudence] has not yet generated any
clear and convincing account of what neutrality actually entails”).
170. While AA is widely regarded as being effective in helping some people with drinking
problems, the system of recovery is not without its critics.  Its efficacy has been questioned by
those who consider misguided, and sometimes counterproductive, AA’s conviction that lifetime
abstinence is the only cure for alcoholism.  See Nancy Shute, The Drinking Dilemma, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1997, at 61-62 (reporting that AA’s “drastic remed[ies]” may
not be the best treatment for all problem drinkers); cf. Thoreson & Budd, supra note 3, at 158-
59 (“Although clinical support abounds for the use of group methods [for treating alcoholism],
empirical support remains weak.”).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
172. See infra note 312.
173. See Honeymar, supra note 104, at 459-60.
174. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
175. See id. at 487-89.
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and private choices of aid recipients.”176  The constitutionally-
mandated principle of government neutrality between religion and
nonreligion was maintained by the government “because the individ-
ual, and not the state, made the decision to support the religious insti-
tution.”177
As in Witters, the Court in Mueller v. Allen allowed a religious
organization to receive incidental benefits from a government pro-
gram.178  In Mueller, the Court held that a state tax deduction for
specified educational expenses did not violate the Establishment
Clause, even though the deduction could be used by parents of chil-
dren attending sectarian schools.179  Characterizing any such aid to
religion as indirect, the Court observed that the aid became available
“only as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents of
school-age children.”180
Upon closer inspection, the analogy between indirect aid cases
such as Witters and Mueller and probationary conditions that require
participation in self-help groups falls apart.  In Witters and Mueller,
the grant recipients chose between an assortment of schools—public,
private and sectarian.  The public option, however, was always avail-
able, as the state is obligated to provide education for children
through the secondary level.  It is unlikely that the Court would have
upheld these aid programs if the secular choice was impractical,
costly, or nonexistent.  If the secular alternative is illusory, the bene-
fit of government support necessarily accrues to the sectarian offer-
ing.  This is what transpires with a probation referral system that al-
lows the probationer to choose between AA and a nonreligious
alternative, or among unspecified self-help groups.  In the self-help
universe, AA dominates in both numbers and methodology, while
acceptable secular alternatives are comparatively scarce and un-
proven. In most states and counties where some secular alternatives
are available, such alternatives serve merely to distract attention
from the state’s close relationship with AA and provide an illusion of
neutrality.  Examined from a different angle, it is arguable that DUI
rehabilitation requirements only exist because AA does.  By sheer
force of AA’s numbers and the dearth of secular alternatives, it is far-
176. Id. at 487.
177. Honeymar, supra note 104, at 459.
178. See 463 U.S. 388, 397-99 (1983).
179. See id.
180. Id. at 399.
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fetched to characterize a probationer’s choice as “genuinely inde-
pendent and private.”181  Thus, the crucial barrier of individual choice
between government and AA crumbles, thereby impermissibly link-
ing the government to delivery of rehabilitation services by a relig-
ious organization.
The Court has also justified the indirect support of religious
groups as sometimes necessary because of the demands of the Free
Exercise Clause182 and other First Amendment rights such as freedom
of association and free speech.183  In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
tors of the University of Virginia,184 a recent case that permitted indi-
rect funding of a religious organization, the Court stated that the
“guarantee of [religious] neutrality is respected, not offended, when
the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies,
extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, in-
cluding religious ones, are broad and diverse.”185
181. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
182. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court invalidated the state’s refusal to exempt fourteen and
fifteen year old Amish students from the requirement of attending school until the age of six-
teen.  See 406 U.S. 205, 234 & n.22 (1972).  The Court determined that the Free Exercise
Clause necessitated exemptions for these Amish children.  See id. at 234.  While recognizing
that this accommodation gave rise to tension with the Establishment Clause, the Court re-
garded the harm to the principle of government neutrality as minimal.  See id. at 234 n.22.
183. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1981) (holding that a public univer-
sity’s policy of not allowing student religious groups to meet in university facilities that were
uniformly available to other groups violated the religious groups’ freedom of association).
184. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
185. Id. at 2521.  In Rosenberger, a student organization that published a newspaper from a
Christian perspective brought suit against the University of Virginia, challenging the univer-
sity’s refusal to pay the printing costs of the newspaper.  See id. at 2511-12.  The university’s
policy was to allow student groups that disclaimed official university approval of their activities
to apply for funding from a general student activities fund.   See id. at 2511.  Wary of the stric-
tures of the Establishment Clause, the university denied funding to print the newspaper based
on its religious focus.  See id. at 2511-12.  The Court held that the university’s denial of funding
amounted to viewpoint discrimination and that the provision of funding would not violate the
Establishment Clause.  See id. at 2524.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor cautioned that no categorical answers should
be drawn from the Court’s decision.  Situating the case at the “intersection of the principle of
government neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious activities,” O’Connor
viewed the decision as fact-driven.  Id. at 2525-26 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  She noted that
the Christian newspaper was competing for readership with fifteen other student publications
of “non-religious, anti-religious and competing religious” slants; this diminished the danger that
the university would be perceived as endorsing a religious viewpoint.  Id. at 2527 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).  Justice O’Connor also observed that the case would be different if a particular
religious viewpoint threatened to dominate the forum.  See id.  (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Be-
cause of the paucity of secular alternatives to AA, it tends to dominate the self-help group
arena; consequently, the government should refrain from promoting this dominance by en-
dorsing or supporting AA.
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Rosenberger is inapposite in the self-help context because of
AA’s dominance.  Probation referral systems that channel proba-
tioners into AA threaten the right to free exercise and vitiate the
government principle of neutrality among religions and between re-
ligion and nonreligion, while perpetuating AA’s preeminent position
in alcohol treatment.  The Court has not validated the indirect sup-
port of religious organizations where that support causes such great
harm to the Establishment Clause, and to a lesser degree, to the mar-
ketplace of ideas.
III. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS IN PRISON
A. Constitutional Rights of Inmates
Historically, prisoners were regarded as “slave[s] of the State,”
who forfeited their liberty and personal rights upon conviction.186
State correctional facilities had free rein to institute draconian poli-
cies and regulations governing prison conditions and inmate behav-
ior.  Prior to the 1970s, federal courts refused on various grounds to
intervene to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, motivated
by the notion that courts are not equipped to supervise the treatment
of inmates.187  The federal judiciary’s longstanding refusal to entertain
complaints alleging deprivation of constitutional rights became
known as the “hands-off” doctrine.188
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of a standard of
review for state prison regulations in 1974.  Justice White’s declara-
tion in Wolff v. McDonnell signaled the end of the hands-off doc-
trine: “There is no iron curtain between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.”189  The Court’s new-found concern for the
186. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).  See generally DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 82 (1971) (describing the harsh conditions endured by inmates in the nineteenth
century).
187. See, e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951) (stating that “it is not
the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentia-
ries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined”).  Federalism was
also cited as a basis for courts’ refusals to entertain prisoners’ constitutional claims.  See, e.g.,
Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950) (declaring that the federal government has no
power to control or to regulate the internal discipline of state penal institutions).
188. See generally Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis
of the Decline of the “Hands-Off” Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795.
189. 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
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rights of prisoners coincided with its more general interest in pro-
tecting the rights of “discrete and insular minorities.”190  Lacking ac-
cess to the political system, discrete and insular minorities cannot ef-
fectively defend their own interests.191  While not wholly blameless for
their political disempowerment, prisoners, in a sense, are the ultimate
discrete and insular minority, because their disenfranchisement pre-
cludes their access to the legislature to defend their constitutional
rights.  Prisons are not democracies and prison administrators, buf-
feted by overcrowding and pinched by financial shortfalls, do not
necessarily regard the protection of inmates’ constitutional rights as a
paramount concern.  It is therefore the proper role of the judiciary to
protect the constitutional rights that prisoners retain.
Under Wolff, the federal judiciary can no longer take a complete
laissez-faire approach to state prison regulation; however, some
commentators have detected a drift toward the spirit of the hands-off
doctrine of the past, as evidenced by increased judicial deference to
the discretion of prison administrators.192  Indeed, vestiges of the fed-
eral judiciary’s hands-off approach toward state prison regulations
manifest themselves in the arguments of those judges who possess a
more restrictive view of the constitutional rights of prisoners.
On numerous occasions, the Court has stated that individuals do
not forfeit all their constitutional rights upon incarceration.193  On the
other hand, prisoners do not retain all the rights of ordinary citizens;
190. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
191. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities,
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1296-97 (1982).
192. See Peter Keenan, 192 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 507, 538-39 (1989) (noting the increasing
deference given to the decisionmaking authority of prison officials by the Court and warning of
the danger this might pose to the constitutional rights of prisoners); see also Cheryl Dunn Giles,
Note, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off” Doctrine?, 35
ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 220, 229-31 (1993) (observing movement in the federal judiciary toward the
hands-off doctrine).
193. In Wolff, the Court listed those areas in which a prisoner retains his constitutional
rights during incarceration:
Prisoners have been held to enjoy substantial religious freedom under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.  They retain right of access to the courts.  Prisoners are
protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
invidious discrimination based on race.  Prisoners may also claim the protections of
the Due Process Clause.  They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law.
418 U.S. at 555-56 (citations omitted) (typeface altered); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974) (stating that inmates retain certain protections afforded by the First Amend-
ment, including the “right to communicate [their] views to a willing listener, including a willing
representative of the press”).
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some rights are removed by the nature of incarceration194 and others
by “valid penological objectives,” such as the rehabilitation of pris-
oners, institutional security, and deterrence of crime.195  To ascertain
which constitutional rights of prisoners can be abridged or circum-
scribed and which ones must remain intact, the Supreme Court in
Turner v. Safley196 set forth a refined rational relationship test for the
constitutional rights of inmates.197  In constitutional law, the selection
of the rational-basis standard of review is significant.  When this
standard is applied to governmental action, the action is almost al-
ways upheld.  Under rational-basis scrutiny, governmental actions are
struck down only if the government has acted in a completely arbi-
trary and irrational fashion or if the action was in pursuit of an ille-
gitimate objective.198
In a five-to-four decision, the Turner Court held that a prison
regulation that impinges on an inmate’s constitutional rights will be
valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”199
To aid this determination, the Court set forth four factors for consid-
eration: 1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the
regulation and a legitimate government interest; 2) if alternative
means of exercising the asserted right are available, courts should de-
fer to prison authorities; 3) courts should assess the ramifications that
accommodation of the right will have on guards, prisoners, and
prison resources; and 4) courts should consider the availability of al-
ternative regulations, the absence of which weighs in as evidence of
reasonableness.200  Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor
stressed that the last factor does not demand that the state act in a
way that is “least restrictive” of prisoners’ rights; rather, the existence
of an easily-implemented alternative which accommodates the pris-
194. For example, the fundamental right to travel.  The notion that prisoners lose certain
rights as a necessary result of incarceration was first clearly set forth by the Court in Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (“Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our  penal system.”).
195. Pell, 417 U.S. at 822 (stating that inmate rights may be limited by “valid penological
objectives”); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974) (“The identifiable gov-
ernment interests at stake in this task are the preservation of internal order and discipline, the
maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilita-
tion of prisoners.” (internal citations omitted)).
196. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
197. See infra text accompanying notes 210-13 (considering possible exceptions to Turner).
198. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
199. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
200. See id. at 89-91.
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oner’s asserted right at de minimis cost to a valid penological interest
serves only as evidence that the regulation may be an “exaggerated
response” by prison authorities to their stated concern.201  Further-
more, the burden of proving the existence of easily implemented al-
ternatives falls on the inmate, not on the prison authorities.202  Suf-
fusing the majority’s evaluation of penological objectives is a
commitment to the “considered judgment of prison administrators”
and the respect and deference the Constitution allows for the judg-
ment of prison officials.203
201. Id.
202. See id. at 90-91.
203. Id. at 91.  It is not only in prisons that the Court takes a more generous approach to the
limitation of First Amendment rights.  In the “special context” of the armed services, burdens
on Free Exercise rights may be justified if rationally related to a legitimate military objective.
This is due in large part to the Court’s recognition that the “military is, by necessity, a special-
ized society separate from civilian society.”  Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); see also
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (rejecting an officer’s challenge to an Air
Force regulation restricting the wearing of headgear indoors and accepting the Air Force
authorities’ claim that uniformity in dress was essential to military order and esprit de corps).
With only one exception, however, the Court, has not addressed the relationship between the
Establishment Clause and the military.  See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971)
(holding that the Military Selective Service Act’s exemption of conscientious objectors from
military service served neutral principles and did not violate the Establishment Clause).  Gov-
ernment provision of chaplains poses an Establishment Clause question, but the Court has not
passed on this practice in the military setting.  The Second Circuit, however, has upheld federal
funding of military chaplains.  See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1985); cf. Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (holding that government funding of legislative chap-
lains is not a violation of the Establishment Clause).  But see James Madison, Detached Memo-
randa, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558-60 (E. Fleet ed., 1946) (condemning use of public money for
legislative or military chaplains).  Thus, the special context of the armed forces calls for great
deference to military authorities and their regulations when addressing Free Exercise claims of
soldiers but does little to illuminate the relationship between the Establishment Clause and the
military.  While it appears that the Court would approve government funding of military chap-
lains, the special context of the military by no means sanctions a coercive, proactive govern-
ment role in propagating religion.  The military chaplain does not seek to convert soldiers in
the same vein as prison AA programs attempt to convert inmates with drinking problems to
AA’s religio-philosophy.  Participation in the chaplain’s ministries is not a requirement for
good standing or advancement in the military, while for some inmates and probationers par-
ticipation in AA is the difference between incarceration and freedom. See Abington Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 298 (1964) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that “there is no ele-
ment of coercion in the appointment of military or prison chaplains; the soldier or convict who
declines the opportunities for worship would not ordinarily subject himself to the suspicion or
obloquy of his peers”).
The special context of the armed services does not translate into minimal scrutiny for
government actions that advance religion in the military, nor should it do so by analogy in the
prison.  At most, the government may provide substitutes, such as the military or prison chap-
lain, in order to ameliorate infringement of Free Exercise guarantees in highly regulated envi-
ronments.  This deviation from the spirit of separation between church and state is limited; in
response to the derogation of the right of free exercise, state involvement in religion may be
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In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Supreme Court adopted the
Turner analysis for prison Free Exercise cases.204  The case arose
when New Jersey prison authorities denied a request by Muslim in-
mates to attend Islamic services.205  The prisoners were assigned to a
work detail that labored on Friday afternoon, during religious serv-
ices.206  State prison officials argued that the prisoners’ attendance at
these services would disrupt the rehabilitative program of the in-
mates and, moreover, that the prison offered other opportunities for
Muslim inmates to practice their faith.207  Applying the Turner four-
factor reasonableness test, the Court ruled in favor of the prison
authorities.208 In so doing, it refuted the contention that more rigor-
ous scrutiny is appropriate when a religious practice is proscribed by
prison authorities.  Instead, the Court stated that while the presence
or absence of alternatives has its place in the overall reasonableness
analysis, the prison’s rejection of alternative means of worship did
not provide a basis for heightened scrutiny.209
Although the Supreme Court has stated that “the standard of re-
view . . . adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the
needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights,”210 sev-
eral courts have refused to apply the Turner reasonableness standard
to prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims.211  In light of the Eighth
Amendment exception that has been carved out of Turner, and the
Court’s observations regarding the special nature of Establishment
Clause rights,212 it is unclear whether the Court meant for Turner to
apply to inmates’ Establishment Clause claims.  Although the Su-
preme Court has not passed on the relationship between Turner and
countenanced to some extent.  On the other hand, “special context” does not stand for the
wholesale abandonment of the Establishment Clause.  Because of the principle of separation of
church and state, the Establishment Clause has a vitality independent of any particular individ-
ual’s rights; this vitality remains unadulterated in any milieu, including a prison.
204. See 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).  It has been noted that in most cases prior to O’Lone
lower courts required something more than a legitimate governmental interest and a means
rationally related to its achievement.  See Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, Untangling First Amend-
ment Values: The Prisoners’ Dilemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1624 (1991).
205. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 345.
206. See id. at 345-47.
207. See id. at 351-52.
208. See id. at 350-53.
209. See id. at 349 n.2.
210. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990).
211. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to apply
Turner to a body search conducted by men at a women’s prison).
212. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
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O’Lone and the Establishment Clause, one federal district court has
stated that, absent accommodations to the Free Exercise rights of
others, a prisoner’s Establishment Clause rights should not be limited
by the mere fact of incarceration.213
B. Griffin v. Coughlin
A divided New York Court of Appeals in Griffin v. Coughlin214
held that David Griffin, an atheist inmate, was unconstitutionally de-
prived of family visitation privileges after he refused to participate in
the AA-based substance abuse treatment program at a correctional
facility in Ulster County.215  The prison authorities made Griffin’s eli-
gibility in the prison’s Family Reunion Program216 contingent upon
his participation in the prison’s Alcohol and Substance Abuse
Treatment Program (ASAT).217 Griffin, who had long expressed his
atheistic views on religion to correctional authorities, objected to the
program’s reliance on religious principles, and requested that he be
excused from the substance abuse program because of its adherence
to those principles.218  The facility’s grievance committee denied Grif-
fin’s request and he filed suit, claiming that the prison’s policy of re-
quiring participation in the substance abuse program in exchange for
eligibility in the Family Reunion Program violated the Establishment
Clause.219  The New York Supreme Court for Ulster County dis-
missed Griffin’s complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed, re-
lying in large measure on AA’s stated policy that it does not promote
a particular conception of God.220
213. See Scarpino v. Grossheim, 852 F. Supp. 798, 804-05 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (stating that the
Lemon test supersedes the Turner approach when addressing Establishment Clause claims).
But cf. Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 831-32 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (suggesting that if a prison
regulation fails the Lemon test it may still be held constitutional under Turner).
214. 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
215. See id. at 99.
216. The Family Reunion Program provides some inmates the chance of receiving selected
visitors.  See id.  Prison authorities specify certain criteria which must be met by the inmate,
including a clean disciplinary record and enrollment in a substance abuse treatment program if
deemed appropriate by prison officials.  See id. at 120 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 100.  The prison authorities required Griffin to take part in the treatment
program because he had a history of heroin use.  See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 100-01.
220. See Griffin v. Coughlin, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1012 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), rev’d, 673
N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).  The Appellate Division also empha-
sized that Griffin, unlike Warner, did not demonstrate that the particular program he attended
engaged in religious exercise such as group prayer.  See id. at 1014 (“[T]he A.A. program that
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Addressing the threshold question of whether the prison’s sub-
stance abuse program was a religion for constitutional purposes, the
New York Court of Appeals found that the program incorporated
the practices and precepts of AA.221  The court then analyzed AA lit-
erature and concluded that it “reflect[s] the traditional elements
common to most theistic religions”222 and expresses the aspiration
that each AA participant “ultimately commit to a belief in the exis-
tence of a Supreme Being”223 and engage in proselytization.224  The
Griffin court determined that the program, in appropriating AA texts
and practices, “embrace[d] and reinforce[d] worship in the A.A.
mold.”225
After concluding that AA is a religion for constitutional pur-
poses, the court briefly noted that the ASAT program was unconsti-
tutional under the endorsement test.226  The court next considered
whether the prison coerced Griffin into participating in ASAT.  The
court observed that no secular program was offered to atheists as a
substitute for ASAT.227  As a result, the court found that the state ex-
ercised coercive power when it conditioned Griffin’s eligibility for the
[Warner] experienced placed a heavy emphasis on spirituality and prayer, in both conception
and in practice.” (quoting Warner II, 870 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y 1994), aff’d, 115 F.3d 1068
(2d Cir. 1997))).  For the Appellate Division, the mere fact that the program was “modeled”
after AA was insufficient to give rise to an Establishment Clause violation.  See id. at 1015.
221. See Griffin, 673 N.E.2d at 101.
222. Id. at 102. The court emphasized that God is named or referred to in five of the
Twelve Steps.  See id.  The court quoted the AA basic doctrinal writings extensively, attempt-
ing to show that they are not merely “deistic symbols and allusions,” id. at 103 (quoting id. at
112 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)), but are, instead, tracts which favor a concept of God “which is
not merely ‘a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic philoso-
phy.’” Id. at 103 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 348 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)).
223. Id. at 102.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 103. The court had no doubt that the AA sessions at the prison were religious
exercises:
The A.A. volunteers who are invited to conduct the prison self-help group
meetings of inmates in the ASAT Program, where the 12 steps are worked, can rea-
sonably be expected to be wholeheartedly imbued with and committed to the relig-
ious precepts predominating in the A.A. basic texts.  It, therefore, is highly unlikely
that the religious indoctrination of A.A. volunteer leaders would not affect the tone
and content of A.A. sessions for inmates.
Id. at 107.
226. See id. at 105.  For further discussion of  the Griffin court’s application of the endorse-
ment test, see infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
227. See Griffin, 673 N.E.2d at 105.
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Family Reunion Program on his participation in the prison’s sub-
stance abuse program.228
As in Warner III, the court relied on Lee v. Weisman; the Griffin
court noted that the Supreme Court in Lee was unanimous in its con-
demnation of state compulsion to participate in a religious exercise.229
The court quoted Lee’s premise that “the State cannot require one of
its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of re-
sisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.”230  The
Griffin court found that the prison employed the “machinery of the
state” to compel attendance of inmates at AA meetings, thereby cre-
ating a captive audience ripe for religious indoctrination.231
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Bellacosa, joined by Judge Ciparick,
concluded that for Establishment Clause purposes, the program is
“overwhelmingly secular.”232  He wrote that the basic texts of AA,
The Big Book and the Twelve Steps, “[s]ubstantially . . . reflect sug-
gested secular and spiritual guideposts [and] not compulsory religious
commandments or tenets of some New-Age or even Old-Time relig-
ion.”233  In sum, Judge Bellacosa reasoned that the program’s goal of
participant sobriety was paramount; its religious packaging did not
amount to a “constitutionally objectionable religious core.”234
Judge Bellacosa criticized the majority for enabling the peti-
tioner to use his Establishment Clause claim as a “sword to justify re-
pression of religion or its adherents from any aspect of public life.”235
He perceived the majority’s approach to the Establishment Clause as
unnecessarily expansive and absolutist; he was particularly troubled
by the majority’s concern for coercion in a preternaturally coercive
setting.236  Judge Bellacosa viewed the reasoning from the school
228. See id. at 108.
229. See id. at 106 n.6.
230. Id. at 106 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The Griffin court also addressed Lemon, but focused primarily on the
“endorsement” refinement of the second prong of the test.  See id. at 108; see also Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the “endorsement
or disapproval” of religion by the state constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause).
231. Griffin, 673 N.E.2d at 106 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
232. Id. at 112 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).  The dissent conceded that ASAT places heavy
emphasis on spirituality, but rejected the constitutional equation of spirituality with religion.
See id. at 118-19 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 113 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 114 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 117 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
236. See id. at 116-17 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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prayer cases as inapplicable to the prison environment because incar-
ceration fails to replicate the “particular risk of indirect coercion” in-
herent in schools.237  Emphasizing the “heightened concern”238 that
the United States Supreme Court has exhibited for the protection of
freedom of religion in elementary and secondary schools, Judge Bel-
lacosa argued that a different level of constitutional analysis obtains
for mature adults in prisons, resulting in reduced access to Estab-
lishment Clause safeguards.239
To parry the majority’s Establishment Clause thrust, the dissent
advances prison regulation jurisprudence as a defense.240  Considering
the Supreme Court’s application of a rational basis test to inmates’
Free Exercise claims in O’Lone, it is of little surprise that Judge Bel-
lacosa would regard the prison prescription of religion as constitu-
tionally unproblematic. Judge Bellacosa reasoned that prison
authorities, under the Turner rubric, have wide discretion to regulate
participation in the Family Reunion Program by setting eligibility re-
quirements, including mandatory attendance at alcohol treatment
programs.241  Judge Bellacosa emphasized that Griffin had a choice to
participate in the visitation program—a benefit to which he is not ab-
solutely entitled by the state.242  He argued that the constitutionality
of this choice must be considered in the context of the prison offi-
cial’s broad discretion to regulate participation in the Family Reun-
ion Program.243  Based on the discretionary nature of the program,
Griffin’s election to participate in it, and the fact that no prisoner is
unqualifiedly entitled to it, Judge Bellacosa contended that the
prison’s policy of requiring AA attendance in exchange for visitation
rights is constitutional under Turner.244
237. Id. at 122 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592
(1992)).
238. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
239. See id. at 120-22 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
240. See id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 199-203
(discussing the rational basis test applied to infringements on prisoners’ constitutional rights).
241. See id. at 120.
242. See id. at 120-21 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536,
541 (N.Y. 1987) (stating that the guidelines of the Family Reunion Program created no legiti-
mate prisoner expectation that they would be afforded visits, and generally allowed broad dis-
cretion by prison authorities).
243. For additional discussion on the constitutionality of this choice, see Part V.
244. See Griffin, 673 N.E.2d at 120-21 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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Judge Bellacosa also found the ASAT program constitutional
under the Lemon test.  He determined that: 1) the program possessed
the secular purpose of treating and reducing substance abuse among
inmates;245 2) had a principal effect of preparing alcohol-dependent
inmates for a return to society;246 and 3) did not delegate the state’s
authority so as to give rise to impermissible governmental entangle-
ment with religion.247
C.  Kerr v. Farrey
In Kerr v. Farrey,248 the Seventh Circuit held that a prison’s pol-
icy of rating an inmate as a higher security risk when he failed to at-
tend the facility’s religion-based drug rehabilitation program violated
the Establishment Clause.  In Kerr, the district court relied on Turner
and Lemon to conclude that the prison’s rehabilitation program,
which was based on AA, was constitutional.  The Seventh Circuit,
however, reversed, rejecting the district court’s reliance on Turner
and its terse Lemon analysis.249
At the time of filing, James Kerr was incarcerated at the Oakhill
Correctional Institution, located in Wisconsin.250  Inmates at Oakhill
with chemical dependence problems were required to attend meet-
ings of Narcotics Anonymous (NA), the only drug-abuse program at
the prison.251  Oakhill had a policy of classifying inmates as higher se-
curity risks if they failed to attend the treatment program after being
instructed to do so by prison officials.252  The elevation of an Oakhill
inmate’s security risk rating had the potential to impact negatively on
the inmate’s parole eligibility.253
Kerr objected to what he perceived as NA’s deterministic view
of God and its association of a belief in God with successful recovery
from addiction.254  Meetings that he attended began with a Christian
245. See id. at 118-19 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 119-21 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 122 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
248. 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
249. See id. at 476.
250. See id. at 474.
251. See id.  The NA program at Oakhill encouraged participants to read the NA book
which contains the Twelve Steps of AA and many references to God and spirituality.  See id. at
474-75.
252. See id. at 475.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 474.
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prayer, and he was encouraged to read the NA book, similar in con-
tent to The Big Book.255  Kerr filed suit under Section 1983, seeking
an injunction to prevent prison administrators from compelling him
and others to participate in NA; he also sought to have any negative
references about his reluctance to attend NA meetings expunged
from his prison records.256
Although the court recognized the continued validity of the
Lemon test,257 it did not feel bound to apply it.  Instead, it formulated
its own Establishment Clause test. The court distilled its test from the
line of Supreme Court cases decided around the principle that the
“‘government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in re-
ligion or its exercise.’”258  When a plaintiff claims that the state is co-
ercing him to subscribe to a religious belief or participate in a relig-
ious exercise, the court regarded three points as crucial: “[F]irst, has
the state acted; second, does the action amount to coercion; and
third, is the object of the coercion religious or secular?”259  The court
answered the first question in the affirmative, since prison officials
required Kerr to attend the meetings.260  Turning to the second prong,
the court deemed this state action coercive as a result of the possible
adverse consequences for Kerr’s parole if he did not attend.261  Lastly,
the court concluded that the object of this coercion—the Oakhill NA
program—was decidedly religious.262 Through a “straightforward
reading” of the Twelve Steps (which the NA program incorporates),
the court determined that Oakhill’s NA program is based on mono-
theistic principles.263  Thus, according to the court’s ad hoc coercion
test, the prison’s policy of compelling Kerr to attend NA meetings
was unconstitutional.
D.  Jones v. Smid
In Jones v. Smid,264 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa rejected an inmate’s claim that the Fort
255. See id. at 475.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 479.
258. Id. at 476 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
259. Id. at 479.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 479-80.
263. See id. at 480.
264. No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993).
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Des Moines Correctional Facility’s substance abuse treatment pro-
gram violated the Establishment Clause.  Eddie Jones had been sen-
tenced to prison for five years after having been convicted of his third
DUI offense.265  The sentence, however, would be suspended, pro-
vided that Jones successfully complete the Fort Des Moines prison’s
Operating While Intoxicated program (OWI), patterned after AA,
while residing at the facility.266  As part of his rehabilitation, he was
required to recite a promise from The Big Book that read in part:
“We will intuitively know how to handle situations which used to baf-
fle us.  We will suddenly realize that God is doing for us what we
could not do for ourselves.”267  After Jones, an atheist, objected to
this feature of the program, counselors told him that he was allowed
to substitute phrases such as a “power other than myself” for “God”
or, instead of reciting the promise, write out what the words in the
promise mean to him.268  Refusing to pursue these alternatives, Jones
was transferred out of the program and therefore failed to meet the
terms of his probation.269  As a result, a warrant was issued for Jones’
arrest.270  A short time later, his probation was revoked and his sen-
tence was reimposed.271  Jones then filed suit under Section 1983, al-
leging that the prison had instituted a religious program in violation
of the Establishment Clause.272
The district court situated its Establishment Clause analysis
within the prison setting, emphasizing that “[a] court may not substi-
tute its judgment on ‘difficult and sensitive matters of institutional
administration’ for the determinations of those charged with the task
of running a prison.”273  While the Jones court recognized that
“[i]nmates retain protection[s] afforded by the First Amendment,” it
noted that these rights are circumscribed by the special characteris-
tics of the prison environment and can be superseded by legitimate
penological objectives of the prison system.274
265. See id. at *1.
266. See id.
267. Id. at *2.
268. See id.
269. See id. at *1-2.
270. See id. at *1 n.1.
271. See id.
272. See id. at *1.
273. Id. at *3 (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)).
274. Id.
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The court next considered whether AA is a religion for constitu-
tional purposes.  The court subscribed to AA’s pronouncements in its
literature that it is a spiritual program and should not be character-
ized as a religion.275  In this regard, the court found the Third Step,
where the definition of God is left to the individual, especially per-
suasive.276  The court concluded that the prison program is a legiti-
mate means to advance the state interest in rehabilitating substance
abusers before their release into society.277  With little rigor, the court
then applied the Lemon test and found the treatment program consti-
tutional.278
E.  Alcoholics Anonymous, Turner, and the Establishment Clause
As the preceding survey of cases indicates, the application of
Turner to inmates’ Establishment Clause claims has a devastating ef-
fect.  Because Turner is essentially a rational basis test, prisoners’ Es-
tablishment Clause claims will almost always lose when assessed un-
der Turner.  The court in Jones v. Smid, the lower court in Kerr v.
Farrey, and the dissent in Griffin succumbed to the seductive call of
Turner and found prison treatment programs modeled on the pre-
cepts of AA to be constitutional.279 Turner is driven by a general
valuation of prisoners’ constitutional rights: valid prison interests, as
identified by prison administrators, define the extent of inmates’ con-
stitutional rights.  Unguided (and untrammeled) by a Supreme Court
decision that addresses the intractable conflict between the Estab-
lishment Clause and legitimate penological interests, judges that ap-
ply Turner to Establishment Clause claims effectively allow prison
275. See id. at *4.
276. See id.
277. See id. at *5.
278. See id.  In finding the program constitutional, the court disregarded the coercion issue
and intimated that prison officials who compelled inmates to participate in the AA-modeled
program were doing such prisoners a favor:
The goal of the OWI program is to keep individuals in the program until completion,
thereby increasing their chance for rehabilitation.  Individuals who complete the
OWI program are eligible for early parole.  [The program manager] testified that ex-
cept for one client, he has recommended early parole for every client who has com-
pleted the OWI program.
Id. at *7.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 240-44, 249, 273-74; see also Boyd v. Coughlin, 914
F. Supp. 828, 834 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that since a rational relationship existed between
required participation in the AA program at issue and the government’s desire to reduce in-
mate alcohol abuse, alleged infringement upon a prisoner’s First Amendment rights was per-
missible).
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officials to impose their own interpretations of proper church-state
relations on inmates.
Refusing to apply Turner to prisoners’ Establishment Clause
claims, the New York Court of Appeals in Griffin v. Coughlin and
the Seventh Circuit in Kerr v. Farrey correctly held that state-
imposed mandatory AA participation for inmates in exchange for
benefits such as visitation privileges and parole eligibility are uncon-
stitutional.  The Griffin and Kerr courts recognized the unique nature
of the Establishment Clause and its applicability to a class whose
constitutional rights are otherwise diminished by the circumstances of
confinement.  The courts did not fall prey to the siren of Turner,
which obscures and weakens the Establishment Clause in those situa-
tions where the power of the state over its citizens is greatest.
As discussed, the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
whether Turner applies to inmates’ Establishment Clause claims.280
As a result of the Court’s application of the Turner factors in O’Lone
v. Shabazz, several lower courts have assumed that Turner covers
both Religion Clauses.281  Although complementary, the Religion
Clauses are not fungible.  The purpose of the Establishment Clause is
to prevent the government from advancing, supporting or endorsing
religion, while the Free Exercise Clause aims to protect an individ-
ual’s ability to practice religion.  Because the constitutional definition
of religion is broad and largely left to the individual, the possible
range and number of claims under the Free Exercise Clause is practi-
cally limitless.  If the government has to consider individuals’ relig-
ious beliefs before acting, the potential reach of the Free Exercise
Clause would paralyze government’s ability to function.  The Court,
however, has ruled that the Constitution does not require this sort of
governmental accounting.282  Thus, to a degree, O’Lone can be coun-
tenanced as in accord with Free Exercise thinking because it con-
strains the reach of the Free Exercise Clause in the prison setting,
thereby allowing prison administrators to enact necessary regulations
in furtherance of legitimate goals of the penal system.  In contrast to
vesting rights in individuals, the Establishment Clause places an obli-
280. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
281. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
282. For example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Court
held that the federal government could build a road through federal land even if such a course
of action made impossible traditional religious rituals of American Indians.  See 485 U.S. 439,
441-42 (1988).  The Court stated that “government simply could not operate if it were required
to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”  Id. at 452.
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gation on government not to advance, endorse, or support religion.
The Court has never reviewed Establishment Clause claims with the
lowest form of constitutional scrutiny, the rational basis test.
Vigorous criticism of Turner’s undifferentiated approach to pris-
oners’ First Amendment claims by members of the Court support
Turner’s inapplicability to Establishment Clause claims.  Dissenting
in Turner, Justice Stevens argued that the “Court’s rather open-
ended ‘reasonableness’ standard makes it much too easy to uphold
restrictions on prisoners’ First Amendment rights on the basis of ad-
ministrative concerns . . . rather than on the basis of evidence that the
restrictions are needed to further an important governmental inter-
est.”283  If the reasonableness standard can be met by finding no more
than a “logical connection” between the prison regulation and a le-
gitimate penological interest as perceived by prison authorities, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that the standard is “virtually meaningless.”284
He argued that the Turner standard condones disregard for inmates’
constitutional rights by allowing deferential trial courts and imagina-
tive wardens to produce “plausible” administrative concerns in re-
sponse to prisoners’ Establishment Clause claims.285  In order to bet-
ter protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, Justice Stevens
advocated the implementation of a sliding scale of scrutiny for in-
mates’ constitutional claims, with the level of scrutiny dependent on
the nature of the right asserted.286
283. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 101 n.1 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
285. Id. at 100-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Indeed, courts applying the Turner test have
been loath to find a regulation unreasonable on the basis that a reasonable alternative exists.
See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226-27 (1990) (finding that an inmate’s liberty
interest in refusing treatment with antipsychotic drugs must accede to the state interest in
prison safety and security despite the presence of alternatives such as physical restraint or se-
clusion); Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that courts must defer to the
discretion of prison officials despite the inmate’s provision of a practicable alternative to a con-
tested regulation); see also Keenan, supra note 192, at 523 (arguing that the Turner Court’s
emphasis on deference in the application of its own test sent the message to lower courts that
they should uncritically affirm the decisions of prison authorities).
286. Justice Stevens approvingly cited Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir.
1985), as making an “attempt to strike a fair balance between legitimate penological concerns
and the well-settled proposition that inmates do not give up all constitutional rights by virtue of
incarceration.”  Turner, 482 U.S. at 101 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In Abdul Wali, the Second
Circuit established three standards, with the applicable standard contingent on the nature of
the asserted right.  See 754 F.2d at 1033.  The least deferential standard was applied where the
assertion of the right was not presumptively dangerous; the court required “prison officials to
show that a particular restriction is necessary to further an important governmental interest,
and that the limitations on freedoms occasioned by the restriction are no greater than necessary
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Justice Brennan, dissenting in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,287
also voiced a general objection to the Turner standard of review.
While noting that incarceration by its nature changes a person’s posi-
tion in society, Justice Brennan contended that in reviewing an in-
fringement of an inmate’s constitutional rights the initial premise
must be that “prisoners retain constitutional rights that limit the ex-
ercise of official authority against them.”288  From this starting point,
the demands of prison security and rehabilitation require the limita-
tion or cessation of certain rights; however, Justice Brennan stressed
that the Constitution was not adopted to enhance “efficiency” or
“reliance on administrative expertise.”289  Categorical deference to
prison authorities offers the remaining constitutional rights of pris-
oners to the altars of efficiency and bureaucracy without reference to
the extent or type of deprivation of rights.290  Justice Brennan dis-
cussed the import of differing levels of scrutiny in establishing that
the protection of certain rights is of more serious concern than oth-
ers.291  To elucidate this point, Justice Brennan proffered an example:
from the perspective of the Turner test, “restricting use of the prison
library to certain hours warrants the same level of scrutiny as pre-
venting inmates from reading at all.”292
The Turner rational-basis test fails to adequately protect the re-
ligious freedom of prisoners.  Several reasons militate against apply-
ing this test to Religion Clause claims.  First, an asserted penological
objective need only be based on a probable concern.  Often, an ab-
stract recitation of a legitimate penological objective—security, de-
terrence, or rehabilitation—is enough to satisfy the general reason-
ableness requirement of Turner.293  Second, the importation of
to effectuate the governmental objective involved.”  Id.  On the other end of the deference
spectrum, if the asserted right was “inherently inconsistent” with the penological objective, the
Abdul Wali court required near total deference to the judgment of prison officials.  Id.
287. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
288. Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291. See id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan advocated the Abdul Wali
framework of analysis, see supra note 286, for prisoners’ constitutional rights claims.  See
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (viewing the Abdul Wali approach as tak-
ing seriously the “Constitution’s function of requiring that official power be called to account
when it completely deprives a person of a right that society regards as basic”).
292. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
293. See, e.g.,  Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 781, 784-85 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a prison
policy prohibiting Islamic services was valid because inmate-led services could turn into “gang
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Turner, a free speech case, into the religious context of O’Lone fails
to address adequately the different qualities of speech and religion.
The Turner test first asks “whether prison regulations restricting in-
mates’ First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without
regard to the content of the expression.”294  Speech regulations which
burden an inmate’s free expression may still be justified so long as
the restriction at issue is one of time, place, and manner as opposed
to one based on content.295  In contrast, religion is not usually amena-
ble to time, place, and manner restrictions, as the practice of most re-
ligions is defined by ritual, which in turn is given meaning by the con-
cepts of time, place, and manner.  Next, the second Turner factor—
whether easily implemented, alternative means of exercising an as-
serted constitutional right exist so as to compensate for the circum-
scription or proscription of a constitutional right—recognizes that
speech, at least most of the time, can be conveyed effectively in a
multitude of ways.  Religion, on the other hand, as the Court has
noted, is subjective; the value of alternatives can only be measured by
the affected individual.296
Additionally, the burden of the fourth Turner factor—whether
ready alternatives exist that fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights
at de minimis cost to legitimate penological interests—is extremely
difficult for prisoners to carry.297  First, by virtue of their positions,
prison administrators have much greater access than courts or pris-
oners to information that would illuminate the likely costs and over-
all feasibility of alternative regulations.  Second, the creation of al-
ternative secular treatment programs likely can only be accomplished
at more than a de minimis cost; attendant costs of bureaucratic dupli-
cation and paying professionals to administer alternative, religion-
free treatment programs virtually ensures that an inmate will not
satisfy Turner’s fourth prong.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
meetings” despite the fact that there had never been any security problems at any past serv-
ices).
294. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
295. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
296. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
297. See Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 834 (N.D.N.Y 1996) (observing that the crea-
tion of an alternative treatment program would adversely affect the prison system financially
and administratively); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *7 (S.D. Iowa
Apr. 29, 1993) (stating that a plaintiff did not offer “easy and ready alternatives” to a prison
program modeled on AA’s Twelve Steps).  Not surprisingly, the aforementioned cases both
held state-imposed attendance at AA meetings in prison to be constitutional.  See Boyd, 914 F.
Supp. at 834; Jones, 1993 WL 719562, at *9.
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the alternative means factor is at loggerheads with the Establishment
Clause.  Either the right to be free from state establishment of relig-
ion exists or it does not; by definition, it cannot be made hierarchical.
Turner facially treats all constitutional rights of prisoners in the
same fashion, regardless of the qualitative differences in asserted in-
terests.  But it must be conceded that certain rights are more compel-
ling and fundamental than others.  An inmate’s Establishment Clause
rights against the state cannot and should not be equated with prison
regulations concerning beard length or attire.  Turner, however, does
not differentiate among constitutional claims and the result is a ra-
tional relationship test applied to inmates’ Establishment Clause
claims.  Thus, in the prison setting, where the power of the state over
its citizens reaches its zenith, there is no meaningful constraint on
government authorities seeking to advance religion.
Over fifty years ago, Justice Jackson noted the danger of pliable
and deferential principles of justification.  He wrote that such princi-
ples lie “about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.
Every repetition imbeds [these] principle[s] more deeply in our law
and thinking and expands [them] to new purposes.”298  As the discus-
sion of Jones and Judge Bellacosa’s dissent in Griffin demonstrates,
the rational relationship test of Turner enables courts to deny serious
consideration to inmates’ Establishment Clause claims and therefore
to uphold state establishment of religion.  This result could not be
what the Supreme Court had in mind when it enunciated the Turner
test.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE
A. The Establishment Clause and Coercion
The preceding discussions of AA cases demonstrate that for
state-supported AA programs to pass constitutional muster, secular
alternatives must exist and serious state compulsion must not be pre-
sent.  These common factors have been decisive in cases addressing
religiously-oriented substance abuse programs, despite governmental
298. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(referring to the majority’s construction of the Due Process Clause to justify the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II).
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coercion not being a prerequisite to prove an Establishment Clause
violation.  The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Establishment
Clause . . . does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not.”299  This makes it difficult to discern
why the Warner III and O’Connor opinions in the probation context,
and the Griffin and Kerr opinions in the prison setting, strongly em-
phasize coercion; it may be that this mode of analysis makes these
decisions more palatable to both an embattled penal system and a
public fed up with crime.
While the Warner III, O’Connor, and Kerr courts ignored the
impact of government support for and involvement with AA on the
separation of church and state, the Griffin court did not; as a result,
the Griffin opinion is schizophrenic.  At the onset of its opinion, the
Griffin court noted that it would find ASAT’s incorporation of AA
doctrine and practices unconstitutional without a finding of coer-
cion.300  The court reasoned that the program violated the Establish-
ment Clause principle prohibiting government endorsement of relig-
ion,301 which stems from the more basic proposition that the church
and state should remain separate.  After it acknowledged that ASAT
violated the endorsement test, the court returned to this theme only
after engaging in a coercion analysis.302  But after a determination
299. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (observing that “the Court has repeatedly recognized that a
violation of the Establishment Clause is not predicated on coercion”); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973) (stating that “proof of coercion . . . [is] not a neces-
sary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause”) (emphasis added).
300. As stated by the court:
even if we were to agree with the Appellate Division’s holding that the governing
principles and practices of A.A., as incorporated in the ASAT Program, do not nec-
essarily require an atheist participant to accept the existence of God in the religious
sense, or to engage in religious activity, we would, nonetheless, find that the . . .
ASAT program violates . . . the Establishment Clause . . . .
Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 101 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997) (citations
omitted).
301. See id. (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).  In concluding that the inclusion of AA as a part of the
ASAT program violated the Establishment Clause under the endorsement test, the Griffin
court found it “unimaginable that inmates in the inherently authoritarian atmosphere of a
prison would not perceive that such a mandatory, exclusive program, facially containing ex-
pressions and practices that ha[ve] always been religious, favors inmates who adhere to those
beliefs, and symbolically condones the religious proselytizing those expressions literally re-
flect.”  Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
302. See id. at 105-06.
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that the prison program itself is unconstitutional under the endorse-
ment test, any assessment of coercion under Lee is superfluous.
While it is true that AA’s exclusivity in a coercive substance abuse
regime strengthens the perception of government endorsement of re-
ligion, exclusivity and coercion are not necessary for such a finding.
The presence of an alternative, secular program, while perhaps help-
ful in staving off a Free Exercise claim, should be of little conse-
quence in a court’s Establishment Clause analysis.  At no time does
the majority specifically address this issue; it simply states that the
“decisive factor” in the opinion was the application of coercive pres-
sure by the state, not the importation of AA tenets and practices into
ASAT.  Indeed, the holding is limited to the prohibition of the coer-
cive elements of the program (i.e., making Griffin’s eligibility in the
Family Reunion Program contingent upon his participation in the
prison’s substance abuse regimen) and does not interfere with an in-
mate’s voluntary participation in ASAT as it is presently consti-
tuted.303  The Griffin court retreated from what could have been a
broad and proper holding, eliminating all state support for religious
rehabilitative enterprises in New York prisons, limiting its ruling to
the coercive aspects of the ASAT program.
Judge Winter, dissenting in Warner III, perceived the church-
state issue most clearly when he chided the majority for its fixation
on inmate choice of treatment programs as a panacea for an other-
wise valid Establishment Clause claim.  Judge Winter viewed the
state’s sponsorship of religion over non-religion as pivotal and ob-
served that the “government may not support religious practices even
when those engaged in them have freely chosen to [engage in the
practices].”304  He elaborated with a hypothetical derived from the
facts of Lee v. Weisman: “[the student’s] constitutional claim could
not be satisfied by an offer of an additional ceremony at the high
school graduation allowing speakers of her choice to express what-
ever spiritual or atheistic views—or disagreements with the spiritual
or atheistic views of others—that were congenial to her.”305
The prison in many respects is similar to the public school.  Both
are owned and operated by the state.  Prisoners and pupils are cap-
303. See id. at 110.
304. Warner III, 115 F.3d 1068, 1080 (2d Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., dissenting).
305. Id. (Winter, J., dissenting).
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tive audiences with diminished constitutional rights.306  The Supreme
Court has, for the most part, purged public schools of government-
supported religious exercise whether the religious practice is elective
or not.  The prison should not be a haven for state-sponsored religion
even if inmates are given a choice to participate in religious pro-
grams.307
B. The Public and Government Funding of Religiously-Oriented
Counseling
The fact that the general bar against taxpayer standing in suits
against the government contains a narrow exception for Establish-
ment Clause claims308 highlights the difference between most consti-
tutional rights, which are of a private concern, and Establishment
Clause rights, which are decidedly public in nature. The Establish-
ment Clause disables government; when the state circumvents this
constitutional disability and advances religion, all citizens are af-
fected.  In Flast v. Cohen, the Court recognized that while injuries to
individual taxpayers may be slight when the government impermissi-
306. For a review of prisoners’ constitutional rights, see supra note 193.  With regard to stu-
dents, the Supreme Court has held several times that they possess limited constitutional rights
under certain circumstances.  See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-66
(1995) (finding that random drug testing of high school athletes without individualized suspi-
cion was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341-42 (1985) (holding that searches can be conducted at public schools if such searches
are reasonably related to objectives of the search and are not excessively intrusive).
307. In what may be a harbinger of even greater cooperation between religion and govern-
ment in rehabilitation, a prisoner program in “religious immersion” was recently instituted in
Texas.  Gustav Niebuhr, Using Religion to Reform Criminals, Texas Tries Immersion in Faith to
Put Inmates on Right Path, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, at A12.  The “Prison Fellowship” pro-
gram is Christian-based and occupies a wing of a prison building where participants live and
pray together.  See id.  The program involves worship services, faith-based study groups, par-
enting classes, and “anger management.”  See id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Texas program, although privately financed and voluntary, see id., raises similar constitutional
concerns as AA does in the prison context.  These concerns include, among other things, the
granting of benefits based on participation in the program and governmental entanglement
with religion.
308. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).  Flast v. Cohen set forth two conditions that
a taxpayer must meet to have standing to sue the government.  First, there must be a “logical
link” between the plaintiff’s taxpayer status and the subject matter of the suit.  Id. at 102.  Sec-
ond, there must be a “nexus” between the taxpayer’s status and the constitutional violation al-
leged.  Id. at 102-03.  This nexus is provided by a specific constitutional limitation on Congress’
power to tax and spend.  See id.  Establishment Clause claims have been the only suits to meet
Flast’s taxpayer suit requirements.  See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 47, at 853 n.14 (stating that
“[o]nly the establishment clause has been identified as sufficient to anchor taxpayer standing to
litigate expenditures not provided for within the same statute levying the tax”).
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bly supports religion, there is a unique connection between the Es-
tablishment Clause and the spending of tax dollars that demands an
exception to the general bar against taxpayer suits.309
While AA has a laudable secular goal of helping alcoholics over-
come their disease, the dangers of state-imposed participation should
not be disregarded by the public.  Judges, wardens, or legislators who
impose AA as a sentencing condition channel potential believers to a
religion.  The coercive effect of the judge’s pen, the legislator’s bill,
or the warden’s command is undeniable: Participate or face a less de-
sirable alternative such as incarceration.
Beyond providing a steady stream of potential converts to AA,
the state runs the risk of ceding a large measure of control over its
drunk driving and prisoner rehabilitation policies to what is arguably
a religious organization.  Where there is no secular self-help program
to which convicted drunk drivers can be referred, or in which prison-
ers can be placed, the government becomes dependent on that sole
provider.  Although some forms of cooperation between the state
and religious organizations are not precluded by the Establishment
Clause,310 the Supreme Court has insisted that there be “no con-
cert . . . or dependency” between the government and religious insti-
tutions.311  The more states emphasize AA in their responses to the
drunk driving problem or prisoner rehabilitation strategies, the fur-
ther the relationship between the state and AA moves toward im-
permissible concert or dependency.
As the preceding discussion indicates, the public has the right to
question the constitutionality of government support of religiously-
oriented counseling and rehabilitation services312 in prisons and via
309. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (stating
that since Flast v. Cohen “we have not questioned the standing of taxpayer plaintiffs to raise
Establishment Clause challenges”).
310. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
311. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
312. It must be noted that AA is officially a self-sustaining organization that does not ac-
cept outside contributions.  See Alcoholics Anonymous World Servs., Inc., Financial Policy
(visited Oct. 26, 1997) <http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/factfile/doc17.html>.  Members
can contribute up to $1,000 a year.  See id.  The organization also derives support from the sale
of AA literature.  See id.  AA’s reliance on small, voluntary contributions and book sales for its
financial health underscores the importance of a continuous stream of new members for the
organization’s ability to survive and thrive.  Other programs based on the Twelve Step para-
digm, but technically not under the purview of AA, may not adhere as scrupulously to this ban
on outside funds.
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probation referral systems.313 The Supreme Court has stated that the
Establishment Clause “absolutely prohibit[s] government-
financed . . . indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious
faith.”314  The issue of funding is particularly relevant in prison-based
programs because even if self-help meetings in this setting are staffed
by AA volunteers,315 the overall prison program in terms of admini-
stration, facilities, and overhead is paid for with tax dollars.  Addi-
tionally, prison programs may not always be able to procure volun-
teers to conduct self-help meetings and may instead have state
employees run meetings.
To inform this discussion, it is helpful to consider Bowen v. Ken-
drick,316 a 1988 case in which the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of government funding of religious organizations that
provided family planning services.  In Bowen, a five to four decision,
the Supreme Court held that the Adolescent Family Life Act
(AFLA)317 did not facially violate the Establishment Clause.318  AFLA
provided federal grants to public or nonprofit private organizations
for services and research in the areas of teenage pregnancy and sexu-
ality.319  AFLA did not explicitly disqualify religious organizations
from receiving federal grants or otherwise suggest that religious af-
filiation should be a criterion for not selecting an organization.320
AFLA, moreover, enlisted the services of religious organizations in
providing counseling about family planning.321
313. It can be argued that because governments channel probationers to AA through their
probation referral systems, they, for all intents and purposes, “fund” AA in the probation con-
text.  These recruits may contribute money to AA and bring in new members themselves,
thereby perpetuating the organization.  Because of the attenuated nature of this funding, the
incidental benefit analysis, see supra Part II.C, is perhaps more appropriate for the probation
setting.  Therefore, this section focuses on the funding of prison-based AA programs, but, in
many respects, is still relevant to the funding of AA in the probation context.
314. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
315. See Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 107 (N.Y. 1996) (noting that AA volunteers are
“invited” to run prison self-help meetings in the ASAT program), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681
(1997).
316. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
317. Pub. L. No. 97-35, sec. 955, §§ 2001-2011, 95 Stat. 357, 578-92 (1981) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1994)).
318. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 622.
319. See id. at 593-94.  Although AFLA is still on the books, the particulars of the Act have
been amended substantially.  The discussion of AFLA in this Note is in the past tense to reflect
the version of the Act that the Bowen Court addressed in 1988.
320. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 608.
321. See 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(B).
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The Court analyzed the constitutionality of AFLA under the
Lemon test.  In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
found that “the elimination or reduction of social and economic
problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parenthood”
was the primary purpose of AFLA, thereby satisfying the first prong
of Lemon.322  Turning to Lemon’s second prong, the Court stated that
the principal effect of AFLA was not the advancement of religion;
the Court emphasized that there was nothing “pervasively sectar-
ian”323 about the counseling services which the religious organizations
provided in connection with premarital sex and teenage pregnancy.324
The Court found it unsurprising that the government’s secular con-
cerns coincided with religious teachings on a social issue such as
teenage sexuality.325  Addressing the third part of the test, the Court
found no excessive government entanglement with religious grant-
ees.326  The Court noted that AFLA’s monitoring function exists only
to ensure that money is not being misappropriated and not to enforce
federal guidelines about the content of advice given or the values in-
stilled by religious organizations in their provision of counseling.327
Thus, the Court determined that AFLA was not unconstitutional on
its face.  But the Court did rule that it may be unconstitutional “as
applied,” remanding for consideration whether specific grants to re-
ligious organizations may have the primary effect of advancing relig-
ion.328
Of crucial importance to the outcome in Bowen was the Court’s
refusal to find that grantees of a religious orientation were necessar-
ily pervasively sectarian in their provision of teenage counseling.329
Since AA’s sole purpose is to treat alcoholism, the conclusion that
AA is a pervasively sectarian institution necessarily means that its
provision of alcohol treatment is pervasively sectarian.  Normally,
when the Court determines that an organization is pervasively sec-
322. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602.
323. Id. at 610.
324. Such services include pregnancy testing, adoption counseling, child care, and consumer
education.  These services, the Court reasoned, are not converted into religious activities be-
cause they are carried out by religious organizations.  See id. at 613.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 615-17.
327. See id. at 616-17.
328. Id. at 620-22.
329. Id. at 610-11.  This makes AA unlike the religious organizations in Bowen which pro-
vided family planning counseling and other religious services.  Hence, this section considers
whether AA itself is a pervasively sectarian organization for constitutional purposes.
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tarian, government aid to these institutions must undergo a rigorous
evaluation as to whether the provision of that aid impermissibly ad-
vances religion, rather than a less stringent Lemon examination.330  At
times, the Court has gone so far as to infer or to assume that the ef-
fect of pervasively sectarian institutions receiving government bene-
fits is the propagation of religion.331  Although there is no authorita-
tive definition of “pervasively sectarian” in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, several cases suggest characteristics that merit consid-
eration in the examination of the sectarianism of a state-funded re-
ligious organization.  These attributes include a high frequency of in-
dividuals attending who share a common religious denomination;332
allegiance to religious dogma;333 indoctrination;334 and direction of
programs by members of religious orders.335
At the onset of this analysis, it must be noted that since the defi-
nition of a pervasively sectarian institution is uncertain and malle-
able, any labeling of AA as such can be easily dismissed or justified
by boundary shifting.  “Religious denominations” can be defined nar-
rowly to encompass only those groups traditionally regarded as re-
ligious sects such as Presbyterianism, Conservative Judaism, or Uni-
tarianism.  AA probably fails this type of designation.  It would be
more appropriate in our increasingly pluralistic society, however, to
expand the concept of religious denomination to encompass any sin-
cere religio-philosophical system by which numbers of people, in
330. See id. at 610.
331. For example, in School District v. Ball, the Court stated that pervasively sectarian
schools “may impermissibly advance religion” in three manners:
First, the teachers participating in the programs may become involved in intention-
ally or inadvertently inculcating particular religious tenets or beliefs.  Second, the
programs may provide a crucial symbolic link between government and religion,
thereby enlisting—at least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters—the powers of
government to the support of the religious denomination operating the school.
Third, the programs may have the effect of directly promoting religion by impermis-
sibly providing a subsidy to the primary religious mission of the institutions affected.
473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
332. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973)
(listing “religious restrictions on admission” as a characteristic of pervasively sectarian schools)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
333. See id. (stating that pervasively sectarian schools often “require obedience by students
to the doctrines and dogmas of a particular faith”).
334. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1971) (noting that “religious indoctri-
nation” is prevalent at “typical sectarian” institutions of higher learning).
335. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1977) (emphasizing in a school-funding
case “that most principals [of the schools at issue] are members of a religious order within the
Catholic Church”).
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whole or in part, lead their lives.  AA also mirrors traditionally re-
ligious denominations in its annual meeting, the General Service
Conference of Alcoholics Anonymous.336  These conventions appear
to be similar to, inter alia, meetings of the U.S. Conference of Catho-
lic Bishops and the Southern Baptist Convention in that they discuss
organizational direction, tenets of faith, deviations from orthodoxy,
membership, and public relations.
AA relies heavily on “religious dogma.”  The Twelve Steps for
members of the AA Fellowship are similar in purpose to the Ten
Commandments.  Both function as “sacred texts” for constitutional
purposes337 and provide adherents with roadmaps for successful liv-
ing.  Additionally, The Big Book proclaims that for an alcoholic to
overcome his addiction he has “to quit playing God.”338  Skepticism of
the idea that man is God, or that man can actually comprehend God,
is a feature of the world’s three great monotheistic religions.339  AA’s
admonition to participants to stop playing God, and instead to look
to a higher power for guidance constitutes religious dogma, along the
same lines that various strands of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic phi-
losophies have set forth.340
Furthermore, the AA system can be regarded as under the direc-
tion of members of a “religious order.”  Based in part on the princi-
ples of the Oxford Group,341 a religious organization which advocated
a return to the spirit of early Christianity,342 AA’s founders highly
valued sharing the good news of one’s own salvation.  AA spread
through the dedication and diligence of a small cadre of true believ-
ers seeking out alcoholics to whom they could impart their knowl-
edge and experience of a proven path to sobriety.343  Bill Wilson, a co-
founder of AA, himself became revered as a living saint by some
members of the Fellowship.344
336. See KURTZ, supra note 8, at 162-63.
337. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (stating that the “Ten Commandments
are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths”).
338. THE BIG BOOK, supra note 33, at 62.
339. See generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD: THE 4,000 YEAR QUEST OF
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 170-208 (1993) (discussing various attempts by monothe-
istic philosophers to make the concept of God accessible to man).
340. See generally id. at 209-256 (relating various Judaic, Islamic, and Christian philoso-
phers’ efforts to personalize God and his Word).
341. See KURTZ, supra note 8, at 48-52.
342. See id. at 50.
343. See id. at 100.
344. See id. at 101.
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AA arguably possesses all the characteristics that the Court has
identified as indicative of a pervasively sectarian organization and
therefore should be regarded as such for constitutional purposes.  As
a result, under the more intense scrutiny given to pervasively sectar-
ian organizations that receive government benefits, taxpayer funding
of AA programs should be held unconstitutional.
If AA were not deemed pervasively sectarian in its provision of
alcohol treatment, funding of prison-based AA programs would still
have to survive the Lemon test.  In assessing government funding of
AA in prisons, courts can easily dispense with Lemon’s first and third
prongs.  Because AA promotes the state’s legitimate interest in reha-
bilitating its prisoners by providing alcohol treatment, prison-based
AA programs satisfy the secular purpose requirement of Lemon.
Such programs, however, fail the test’s third prong, which states that
a government action must not create an excessive government entan-
glement with religion. Prison administrators oversee and heavily
regulate all aspects of prison life, including rehabilitation regimes.345
The government’s intense involvement with prison treatment pro-
grams based on AA necessarily fosters an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.
Prison-based AA programs also fail Lemon’s second prong,
which prohibits the government from taking actions that advance re-
ligion.  That AA is providing counseling services informs this conclu-
sion.  On a number of occasions, the Court has emphasized the in-
herent risk that counselors will impart their religious beliefs during
the course of instruction, whether deliberately or inadvertently.346
Justice Blackmun underscored this danger:
The risk of advancing religion at public expense, and of creating an
appearance that the government is endorsing the medium and the
message, is much greater when the religious organization is directly
engaged in pedagogy, with the express intent of shaping belief and
changing behavior, than where it is neutrally dispensing medication,
food, or shelter.347
Relying on Lemon, the Court repeatedly has struck down pro-
grams which have no effective means of guaranteeing that aid will be
345. See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (1994).
346. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 372, 388 (1985) (observing that teachers may
“subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in which they teach”).
347. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 641 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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used exclusively for secular purposes.348  Aid to organizations per-
forming secular and sectarian functions has only been upheld in situa-
tions where such a program has survived a searching inquiry to en-
sure that no state funds flow to the organization’s religious
activities.349 Because AA’s secular service of alcohol treatment is in-
separable from its religious philosophy, the Court’s credo that the Es-
tablishment Clause “absolutely prohibit[s] government-financed or
government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular
religious faith”350 and Lemon’s second prong are violated by state-
funding to AA.  Thus, regardless of whether AA is a pervasively sec-
tarian organization, prison-based AA programs funded by taxpayer
dollars almost certainly are unconstitutional under Lemon.
V. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THE RIGHT/PRIVILEGE
DISTINCTION, AND THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS
Much of this Note has criticized the narrow interpretations of
the Establishment Clause by various courts.  In essence, these courts
contend that a government action only violates the Establishment
Clause if that action coerces an individual to participate in a religious
activity.  As has been discussed, this spare reading of the Establish-
ment Clause does great injury to the principle of separation of church
and state because of its emphasis on the individual.  If courts must as-
sess an individual’s claim that he was coerced into participating in a
religious practice such as AA, they should employ more tailored
analytical frameworks.  More specifically, courts should look to Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence and the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions for guidance because they focus on individuals rather than
348. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977) (striking down field trip aid pro-
gram as “an impermissible direct aid to sectarian education”); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
365 (1975) (invalidating an equipment loan program to sectarian schools because of insufficient
mechanisms for “channeling aid to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian”);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) (holding that
aid to nonpublic schools for cost of state-mandated tests was unconstitutional because the state
failed to “assure that the state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrina-
tion”).
349. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-45 (1973) (finding that a general revenue
bond benefitting a Baptist college was constitutional because it excluded from participation
facilities used for religious purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681 (1971) (upholding
federal grants for construction of college and university facilities because there was “no evi-
dence that religion seeps into the use” of the facilities in question).
350. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
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institutional arrangements, which is the traditional province of the
Establishment Clause.  As a full exposition of the relationship be-
tween AA and the Free Exercise Clause is beyond the scope of this
Note,351 this Part considers only the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine. This Part explains briefly the doctrine’s history, assesses vari-
ous courts’ treatment of claims in light of the doctrine, and concludes
that mandatory AA participation violates the doctrine.
A.  Right-Privilege Distinction
Under the old “right-privilege” distinction, the Due Process
Clause applied only when the government took an individual’s prop-
351. Following is a summary of recent developments in Free Exercise Clause doctrine and a
list of cases that have addressed state-imposed participation in AA under the Clause.
With the invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994) (requiring all laws substantially burdening the free exercise
of religion to be the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest), by
the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997), claimants will have
a more difficult time proving that mandatory participation in AA burdens their rights under the
Free Exercise Clause.  As a result of Flores, the test to determine whether a government action
constitutes a Free Exercise Clause violation is once again contained in the holding of Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.  In Smith, the Court
held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not
supported by a compelling governmental interest advanced by the least restrictive means.  See
494 U.S. at 885.  The return to Smith requires a much weaker showing by the government; no
longer, as under RFRA, is a compelling state interest and the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that interest required to justify an infringement of Free Exercise rights.  See id.
Two federal courts have rejected claims by prisoners that state-imposed participation in
AA violates the Free Exercise Clause.  See Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL
719562, at *8 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993) (holding that an inmate’s right to Free Exercise was not
violated during his mandatory participation in a prison’s substance abuse treatment program
because his participation did not seriously burden his religious beliefs); Stafford v. Harrison,
766 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (D. Kan. 1991) (denying an inmate’s claim that his Free Exercise rights
were violated by his required participation in an AA-modeled substance abuse program be-
cause the program did not cause the inmate to “abandon or contravene” his faith).
Several other courts have considered AA in connection with the right to Free Exercise,
but only in passing.  See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1081 (2d
Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., dissenting) (stating that “[c]ompulsory attendance at religious ceremo-
nies as part of a penal sentence [implicates] . . . the Free Exercise Clause and might well re-
quire the provision of a choice between secular and sectarian programs”); Kerr v. Farrey, 95
F.3d 472, 481 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiff failed to develop adequately his Free Exer-
cise claim that Narcotics Anonymous burdened his belief in free will); Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F.
Supp. 828, 833-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim because he failed
to demonstrate that a belief or practice of his had been adversely affected by state action); Fea-
sel v. Willis, 904 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that it was not “clearly established”
that mandatory participation in AA violated the Free Exercise Clause).
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erty or invaded his bodily integrity.352  When the government denied
an individual benefits such as employment or welfare, the Due Proc-
ess Clause was inapplicable.353  This “tough-minded distinction be-
tween constitutionally protected rights and unprotected governmen-
tal privileges” bludgeoned constitutional claims associated with
governmental largess.354  In 1970, the Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly355 rejected the right-privilege distinction.  In Goldberg, the
Court extended procedural safeguards to government benefits in or-
der to protect recipients from unwarranted termination or denial of
such benefits.356
The majority opinions in O’Connor and Jones, and the dissents
in Warner III and Griffin come perilously close to resurrecting the
repudiated right-privilege distinction. An underlying but not fully ar-
ticulated rationale for judges to find mandatory AA programs consti-
tutional is the justification that the greater power to withhold a bene-
fit includes the lesser power to condition its receipt, regardless of
whether the conditions impact constitutionally protected rights.357
For example, the State of New York could do away with family visita-
tion programs entirely and all inmates would lose the benefit of fam-
ily visits.  If New York decides to keep the family visitation program
in place, the “greater-includes-the-lesser” rationale allows the State
to condition participation in the visitation program on participation
352. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The right-
privilege distinction stems from a famous utterance by Justice Holmes, then on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts.  The future Supreme Court Justice wrote that a person “may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892).
353. See Reich, supra note 352, at 742 (tracing the increasing applicability of the Due Proc-
ess Clause); see also, e.g., Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (Tenn. 1927) (holding that a
teacher has “no right or privilege to serve the state except upon such terms as the state pre-
scribe[s]” and that in dealing with its employees qua employees the state is not constrained by
the Fourteenth Amendment).
354. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (1968).
355. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 354, at 1462-64 (charting the ero-
sion of the “right-privilege” distinction and the rise of alternative doctrines, employing substan-
tive due process approaches, to check the increasing power of government).
356. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
357. Cf. Warner III, 115 F.3d 1068, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., dissenting)
(contending that Warner took initiative in selecting AA in the hope of receiving a more favor-
able sentence to which he was not constitutionally entitled); Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98,
120-21 (N.Y. 1996) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (observing that Griffin “voluntarily chose” to
place his religious beliefs at risk in exchange for privileges to which he was not unqualifiedly
entitled).
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in a rehabilitation program based on AA.  The prisoner’s price of
enjoying the benefits of the program is, in effect, the surrender of
constitutional rights.
B.  The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The right-privilege distinction had been criticized long before its
ultimate rejection.  In 1926, Justice Sutherland wrote what has be-
come the most familiar presentation of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions, the approach to government benefits that eventu-
ally superseded the right-privilege distinction:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of
state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip
the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to
uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the
guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege
which the state threatens otherwise to withhold.358
No case thus far considering AA as a probation condition or re-
quirement for prisoner privileges has examined the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions as a grounds to declare state-imposed AA
participation as unconstitutional.  The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, however, captures nicely the dynamic of the unequal bar-
gaining relationship between the government and an AA participant
and can serve to protect constitutional liberties from government en-
croachment via indirect methods.359  The doctrine requires that
“government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the bene-
ficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may
withhold that benefit altogether.”360  In McDaniel v. Paty,361 Justice
358. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).  For a gen-
eral overview of this doctrine, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989), and, as it may apply to the Establishment Clause, see Michael W.
McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment
Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989).  Other commentators have assessed certain proba-
tion requirements in light of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  See, e.g., Tracy Ballard,
The Norplant Condition: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, 16 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 139,
170-86 (1993) (contraception).
359. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious
Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1048 (1991) (“The function of an unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is to preserve certain protected constitutional liberties in an environment of pervasive
governmental activity.”).
360. Sullivan, supra note 358, at 1415.
361. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
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Brennan applied this idea to a Free Exercise claim and stated that
“government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the
imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.”362 In the con-
text of this Note, the “benefits” withheld include visitation rights, pa-
role, or continued freedom from incarceration; the “right” surren-
dered is the liberty to worship or not worship a God according to the
dictates of one’s own conscience.  The prison authorities cannot force
an inmate to attend a Catholic Mass or a Jewish service; nor can they
do so indirectly by offering a reduced sentence to the inmate who at-
tends such services.  Once the determination is made that AA is a re-
ligion the outcome for mandatory AA programs under the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is ineluctable: the government cannot
induce AA participation through the provision of benefits to those
who participate.363  Moral philosopher Robert Nozick abstracts the
effect of a coercive proposal on the weaker party in an exchange:
If the alternatives among which Q must choose are intention-
ally changed by P, and P made this change in order to get Q to do A,
and before the change Q would not have chosen (and would have
been unwilling to choose) to have the change made (and after it’s
made, Q would prefer that it hadn’t been made), and before the
change was made Q wouldn’t have chosen to do A, and after the
change is made Q does A, then Q’s choice to do A is not fully his
own.364
Viewed in this light, wardens and judges who condition benefits
on participation in AA programs are making religious choices for
their charges, a role that the state cannot assume. The government,
knowingly or not, is using its monopoly over the selection and provi-
sion of benefits in the prison and probation systems to channel in-
mates and probationers into religious programs.  Harm is not done
just to those brave or resourceful enough to assert their rights but
also to the untold number who feel they have little choice but to
comply.
362. Id. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring).
363. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court followed similar logic, finding that a state violated
Sherbert’s right to free exercise when it withheld her unemployment compensation benefits
because she refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons.  See 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1968).
The Court stated that Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was forced to choose between re-
ceiving benefits from the state and following her religion.  See id. at 404.
364. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440, 463 (Sidney
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
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CONCLUSION
As theologian Richard Neuhaus has written, “[r]eligion is incor-
rigibly interventionist;”365 this is especially true of the Judeo-Christian
brand, with its claim to universal truths.366  Despite its formal dis-
claimers and protestations, AA, in its history, theory, and practice,
closely tracks, and sometimes appropriates, elements of Judeo-
Christian monotheism.  While AA disavows any claim to metaphysi-
cal and eschatological insight, the very fact that the program is based
on the belief that supplication to a higher power is necessary to cure
the disease of alcoholism ascribes meaning to the divine.  Participa-
tion in the Fellowship and adherence to the Twelve Steps then be-
comes a form of worship or homage.
The demonstrated success of AA is sure to tantalize embattled
prison administrators and sentencing judges as a valuable aid in their
efforts to rehabilitate prisoners and DUI offenders.  But the enlist-
ment of a religious instrument by the state to achieve even a salutary
end comports with neither law nor history.  As James Madison as-
serted in his seminal writing on religious liberties, Memorial and Re-
monstrance, “[i]t is the duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to
him.”367  The notion that a prisoner’s or probationer’s conscience is
less inviolable than that of an unfettered citizen vitiates the sanctity
of the First Amendment and does a disservice to the rehabilitative
functions of prison and probation.
The argument in some instances may be made that prisoners or
probationers freely choose to participate in AA programs to receive
benefits to which they are not constitutionally entitled; however, it is
far too late in religious freedom jurisprudence to suggest that the
government should seek to commodify religious rights and liberties.368
365. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 144 (1984).
366. See id.
367. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
COMPLETE MADISON 299, 300 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
368. Many commentators have made the argument that certain constitutional rights are
inalienable, or should be treated as such.  See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE
100-03 (1983) (citing a list of so-called “blocked exchanges”—things that cannot be bought or
sold in the United States—including personal liberty, First Amendment rights, and the right to
marry and procreate); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN L. REV. 957,
974 n.59 (1982) (“Those things which constitute the will or personhood must, however, be in-
alienable.”) (citing GEORGE FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 66 (T. Knox trans.,
1821)).
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The Supreme Court has long viewed religious freedom as an essential
attribute of an individual’s identity; to encourage the alienability of
religious liberty demeans and cheapens the Religion Clauses and,
consequently, injures personal identity.  Benefits of family visitation,
reduced sentences, and more favorable probation terms should not
accrue only to those who are willing to subscribe to the state’s choice
in religiously-oriented substance abuse treatment providers.  The tar-
geting of benefits in this fashion obliterates government neutrality
and the principle of equality under the law as surely as the indis-
criminate imposition of harm.  To allow the state to advance religion
under the guise of rehabilitation in conjunction with the “purchase”
of religious rights in the closed market of the prison or the monopo-
listic market of probation denigrates the concept of religious liberty
in America.
As a result of decades of rising crime rates and a revival of the
importance of self-responsibility in our society, criminals elicit little
sympathy from the populace.  The imposition of a religious system on
some of the most vulnerable members of our society, however,
should not serve as an outlet for our pervasive sense of frustration
with crime, criminals, and the overburdened criminal justice system.
Although probation and confinement diminish some constitutional
rights of individuals, these circumstances alone do not trump the Es-
tablishment Clause, which has an independent vitality that reaches
into the darkest dungeons.  For inmates and probationers, the wall of
separation between church and state is not superseded by prison
fences or the terms of probation. If religious indoctrination is coun-
tenanced as acceptable in these contexts, the reach of the Establish-
ment Clause is reduced, replaced by the “considered judgment” of
prison authorities and the wide discretion of sentencing judges.  This
result bodes ill for the principle of separation of church and state.
